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Special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces (hereafter referred· 
to as general purpose forces or GPF) frequently operate together under a unified 
chain of command. When they do, conventional wisdom places GPF in command. 
In unconventional warfare operations, however, this subordination of SOF to GPF 
may hinder the ability of the integrated force to design and implement an 
appropriate solution. 
This thesis examines the integration of SOF and GPF in unconventional 
warfare (UW) from an organizational perspective. It begins by examining the 
unique challenges posed by UW problems and establishing the organizational 
culture and functional specialization of SOF and GPF. It posits that SOF is, from 
an organizational perspective, better suited to designing solutions to UW problems 
than GPF. It further posits that by subordinating SOF to GPF the likelihood of the 
integrated force designing a campaign strategy appropriate for a UW problem is 
greatly reduced. It then uses the US involvement in Vietnam to test these 
hypotheses. The thesis concludes that organizational factors do, in fact, play a role 
in the formation of strategy, and that careful consideration of the command 
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Military Victories are not gained by a single 
arm--though the failure of any arm or Service 
might well be disastrous--but are achieved through 
the efforts of all arms and Services welded into 
... [a] team. 
--George Marshall 1 
A. BACKGROUND 
As the above statement by General Marshall points out, 
the United States has long been interested in integrating 
service capabilities in war. In recent years, the emphasis 
on integration has grown even stronger. Since 1990, the 
Joint Staff has produced 107 joint doctrinal manuals which 
provide authoritative guidance for integrating service 
capabilities and conducting joint operations. Joint Pub 1, 
Joint Warfare of the U S Armed Forces, is entirely 
dedicated to emphasizing the tradition and importance of 
service integration. Additionally, joint assignments have 
become a virtual necessity for career progression and 
promotion to the highest ranks for officers of all services. 
In spite of this increased emphasis on integration, 
however, operations conducted by special operations forces 
(SOF) and those conducted by conventional forces (here after 
referred to as general purpose forces or GPF) are often 
1 George Marshall, speech to the Air Corps Tactical School, 19 September, 1938. 
----- -------- ---------------------------------' 
perceived as separate and distinct. There is a tendency to 
think of SOF only as elite commandos who perform daring 
raids and hostage rescues of the type made famous by the 
Israelis at Entebbe. They are often perceived as 
responding directly to the president and the national 
command authority and having little to do with more 
traditional army, navy, and air force units. 
While it is true that these missions are occasionally 
performed by SOF acting unilaterally and that these missions 
are one reason for maintaining an organizationally distinct 
SOF, they do not represent the "lion's share" of SOF 
' 2 operatlons. The reality is that most SOF operations and 
missions are not conducted unilaterally, but rather are 
integrated with GPF. One could even argue that almost all 
operations conducted by SOF are integrated with GPF at 
either the tactical, operational, or strategic level of 
warfare. 
Thus, integration occurs not only between military 
services, but between various types of military forces as 
well. It is this latter type of integration, and 
2 For a complete treatment of the reasons for maintaining an organizationally distinct SOF, see Eliot A 
Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modem Democracies, (Cambridge: Center for 
International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), Chapter 2, pp. 29-52. 
2 
specifically the integration of SOF and GPF, with which this 
study is concerned. 
1. Integrated Operations Defined 
For purposes of this study, the term integrated 
operations will refer to those operations involving both SOF 
and GPF working together to accomplish a task. Integrated 
operations are defined, then, as operations which involve 
both SOF and GPF working together under a unified command 
and control structure to accomplish a specific mission or 
conduct a campaign. It is useful to note that integrated 
operations can be, and usually are, joint as well. 
2. The Scope of Integration 
Integrated operations can, and do, occur across the 
entire spectrum of conflict, from peacetime contingency 
operations to high intensity conventional war. Recent 
humanitarian operations in Somalia and Rwanda are examples 
of integrated operations at the low end of the spectrum, and 
the Persian Gulf War is an example at the high end. 
Integration can also be thought of as occurring at two 








level, integration is 
planning and conducting 
operations in pursuit of an established campaign strategy. 
At the strategic level, integration consists of the process 
through which a particular campaign strategy is decided 
upon. Tactical integration can be thought of as the process 
of planning and executing a single mission. Strategic 
integration, on the other hand, can be thought of as the 
process of deciding upon the type of missions to be executed 
and the way in which they are choreographed to accomplish 
the larger goals of policy. An example from Operation Just 
Cause may help to clarify these concepts. 
In Operation Just Cause, the planning and execution of 
the airfield seizure mission at Torrijos Tocumen and the 
follow-on introduction of GPF combat forces is an example of 
tactical integration. SOF and GPF worked together under the 
unified command and control of the XVIII Airborne Corps, 
acting as the JTF headquarters, to accomplish their assigned 
missions in pursuit of the overall campaign plan. The way 
in which SOF and GPF organizations worked together to design 
the campaign plan, within the unified command and control 
framework of United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), is 
an example of strategic integration. 
4 
B. PURPOSE 
Despite the fact that integration of SOF and GPF is a 
common characteristic of Department of Defense (DOD) 
operations, little scholarly attention has been devoted to 
the subject. Although the interest in special operations 
and special operations forces has grown significantly in 
recent years, most of the literature has focused either on 
historical narrative of specific operations and units, or 
high-level political considerations associated with the 
existence and use of SOF organizations. 3 While these works 
contain some valuable insights into the integration 
process, little effort has been made at developing a 
comprehensive, analytical understanding of that process. 
What little work has been done concerning integration has 
focused mostly on the tactical level in predominantly 
conventional conflicts. 4 The purpose of this study is to go 
beyond the work that has already been done and closely 
examine the process of integration at the strategic level in 
3 For a more detailed review of recent literature on special operations and special operations forces see 
John Arquilla, From Troy to Entebbe: Literary and Historical Perspectives on Special Operations, 
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1996), p. xiii. 
4 See Captain Michael M. Kershaw, The Integration of Special Operations and General Purpose Forces, 
Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1994 for an analysis ofthe integration process 
in short duration, conventional strike missions. 
5 
operations that fall outside the conventional warfare region 
of the spectrum of conflict. 
C. WHY UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
There are two primary reasons for studying integration 
in unconventional warfare. First, national interests have 
in the past and will in the future continue to demand that 
the U.S. military become involved in unconventional warfare. 
In the early stages of the cold war, when Premier Khrushchev 
promised Soviet support for unconventional "wars of national 
liberation," 5 the American strategy of containment made 
confronting such wars a necessity. Similarly, the rise of 
terrorist activity in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
presented the United States with a new threat that was not 
very susceptible to a conventional military response. The 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war 
have brought no respite from unconventional threats and 
conflicts. In fact, just the opposite seems to be true. 
Since 1989 the United States has fought one middle intensity 
war, but has also deployed forces on humanitarian operations 
to Somalia, Rwanda, and several other locations; engaged in 
5 Cited in Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy 
and Policy, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977) p. 456. 
6 
..... --------------------------------------------·-·-····--· 
limited combat operations in Somalia; and currently has 
troops deployed on various types of nation building and 
peacekeeping missions in Haiti and Bosnia. These operations 
all represent cases in which the perceived interests of the 
United States have required a military response short of 
conventional war, and all have involved both SOF and GPF to 
one degree or another. 
The second, and perhaps more compelling, reason for 
examining integration in unconventional warfare is that this 
type of warfare has long been perceived as a soft spot in 
America's armor. Both politicians and academics have 
expressed this sentiment. President Kennedy, for example, 
who had a personal fascination with guerrilla warfare, felt 
the U.S. military was ill-prepared to deal with the prospect 
of confronting communist backed • • 6 1nsurgenc1es. This was 
evidenced by his assertion in 1962 that unconventional 
warfare required "a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly 
different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly 
different kind of military training." 7 Members of Congress 
have also perceived the U.S. unconventional capability as 
6 Ibid., p. 456. See also Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1986), pp. 27-33. 
7 Ibid., p. 457. 
7 
being weak. On May 15, 1986, Senator William S. Cohen (R-
Maine) expressed a widespread, bipartisan, congressional 
concern when he stated "a new form of warfare has emerged in 
recent years, a form of warfare we have not properly 
understood, and that we have not effectively s deterred." 
On the academic side, Loren B. Thompson, deputy director of 
the National Security Studies Program at Georgetown 
University, asserted in 1989 that "[o]ne characteristic of 
low-intensity conflict that has become all too clear 
recently is that when the United States is drawn into such 
warfare, it usually performs poorly." 9 
Unfortunately, there is no shortage of evidence to back 
up these assertions by the politicians and academics. The 
U.S. failure in Vietnam is, of course, the most obvious. 
However, recent difficulties in Somalia and, to a lesser 
degree, Haiti, seem to indicate that there still much 
room for improvement, and a better integration of SOF and 
GPF and an understanding of the organizational factors which 
influence the development of strategy may be a significant 
first step. 
8 Senator William S. Cohen, Congressional Record, May 15, 1986. 
9 Loren B. Thompson, ed. Low-Intensity Conflict: The Pattern of Warfare in the Modem World, 
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989) pp. ix. 
8 
,..-----------------------------------------------------
D. THE PROBLEM 
One reason for poor performance in unconventional 
warfare may be the way in which integration of SOF and GPF 
takes place. When integration occurs, conventional wisdom 
calls for the placement of SOF in support of GPF. In a 
recent statement to the Senate Committee on Armed Services 
General Wayne Downing, Commander in Chief ( CINC) of the 
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), stated: 
Special operations may be performed during periods 
of peace or war to support conventional operations 
or as independent operations when the use of 
conventional forces is either inappropriate or 
infeasible. 10 
Little consideration seems to be given by either 
community to the idea of GPF supporting SOF. This may seem 
like a trivial distinction or a matter of semantics, but 
careful consideration reveals otherwise, particularly at the 
strategic level of integration in operations that fall 
outside the conventional warfare area of the spectrum of 
conflict. 
SOF became a permanent part of the force structure in 
the late 1950s. Since that time, as a result of their 
10 Taken from the transcript ofthe statement of General Wayne A. Downing, Commander in Chief, United 
States Special Operations Command, before the Senate Committee on Armed Services given in February, 
1995, p. 1. 
9 
mission profile, they have developed along organizationally 
distinct lines within DOD. They have specialized in 
different tasks and missions and, as a result, have 
developed a different organizational culture than GPF. 11 
SOF, for example, typically operate in small units designed 
for independent action, are regionally oriented, strive to 
maintain language and cultural skills, and operate using a 
theory of relative superiority which relies heavily on 
intelligence and is often associated with the minimum use of 
force. 12 GPF, on the other hand, tend to operate in large 
units, have world-wide responsibilities, and prefer to 
operate using a theory of overwhelming force. 
Organization theory suggests these differences in 
functional specialization and organizational culture may 
influence both the way in which SOF and GPF perceive 
problems, and their preferences for solutions. Thus, when 
the two forces operate together, the nature of the strategic 
solution, or campaign plan, the integrated force adopts may 
11 Within organization theory there are several definitions for the term "organizational culture." While 
there are subtle differences which organization theorists might argue about, for purposes of this study it is 
sufficient to defme organizational culture as a set of important understandings, beliefs, and patterns of 
behavior, often unstated, that members of an organization share in common. For a more complete 
discussion of organizational culture, see Lisa A Mainiero and Cheryl L. Tromley, Developing Managerial 
Skills in Organizational Behavior, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1989). 
12 For a complete treatment of the theory of relative superiority in special operations see William 
McRaven, SPEC OPS: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice, (Novato, CA, 
Presidio Press, 1995), Chapter I, pp. 1-25. 
10 
depend substantially on which organization is in charge. 
One might expect that when GPF are in charge, the strategic 
solution would reflect their preference for overwhelming 
force and emphasis on maneuver warfare. Conversely, when 
SOF are in charge, one might expect to see solutions which 
reflect a less robust use of force, a greater reliance on 
intelligence, and application of psyops and civil affairs 
campaigns directed specifically at the local .population. 
Under the current unified command plan, when integrated 
operations take place, SOF are virtually always subordinate 
to a GPF organization. This subordination usually takes the 
form of a JTF headquarters commanded by a conventional 
• • 13 
organ1zat1on. This subordination occurs in both 
conventional operations such as Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 
as well as more unconventional operations such as Vietnam, 
Somalia, and Haiti. In conventional operations this 
subordination is appropriate because both the functional 
specialization and organizational culture of GPF are a "good 
match" for the task at hand. GPF are well suited to 
developing effective campaign plans and strategic solutions 
13 For a complete description of the doctrinal command relationships for SOF operating as part of a JTF 
see Joint Publication 3.05, Doctrine For Joint Special Operations, (Draft, February I995) Chapter III, pp. 
35-43. 
II 
for conventional wars and SOF are used in essentially a 
force multiplier role. However, operations that fall 
outside the conventional arena into the category currently 
described by the military as operations other than war 
(OOTW), or low intensity conflict (LIC), typically require 
solutions that are inconsistent with GPF's functional 
specialization and culture, and more consistent with SOF's. 
Thus by subordinating SOF to GPF in these unconventional 
operations, the probability of adopting an appropriate 
strategic solution may be greatly reduced. 
E. AN ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH TO INTEGRATION 
Integration at the strategic level can be thought of 
essentially as the process through which a strategic 
solution is chosen or a campaign plan developed. The 
primarily hierarchical nature of military organization means 
that ultimately the responsibility for strategic choice 
rests with the commander, usually at either the regional 
CINC, or JTF level. The question is, what influences the 
choices available to the commander and the way in which he 
decides? Organization theory suggests that functional 
specialization and organizational culture provide at least 
partial answers to this question. 
12 
1. Organizational Culture Defined 
In the field of social anthropology. There, the 
concept of culture is used in a very broad sense to 
represent the values and behavior patterns of any specific 
group that are passed from one generation to the next. The 
term organizational culture has been used by organization 
theorists and economists to refer to the basic values and 
behavior patterns of specific organizations. Although the 
term was originally used with respect to business firms, 
scholars such as Graham Allison, Barry Posen, and Carl 
Builder have extended it to government and military 
• • 14 
organ1zat1ons. 
Within organization theory, there are several 
definitions of organizational culture. While theorists 
might argue over the minor differences found between .them, 
for purposes of this study it is sufficient to define the 
term as follows: 
a set of important understandings, beliefs, and 
patterns of behavior, often unstated, that members 
f . . h . 15 o an organ1zat1on s are 1n common. 
14 See Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1971). See also Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France Britain and 
Germany Between the World Wars, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), and Carl H. Builder, The 
Masks of War: American Military Strategy and Analysis, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 
1989). 
15 This definition is adapted from those found in Mainiero and Tromley, p. 309, John P. Kotter and James 
L. Heskett, Corporate Culture and Performance, (New York: The Free Press, 1992), pp. 3-4, and Builder, 
pp. 7-10. 
13 
Organizational culture, then, can be described, as it 
is by Allison, as a "perceptual lens" through which members 
of an organization view the world. Allison also 
demonstrates, as do Posen and Builder, that organizational 
culture is a powerful tool for explaining both behavior and 
d . . k' 16 eclSlon rna lng. 
2. Functional Specialization Defined 
Functional specialization is a very straightforward 
term and concept. It is, simply stated, the missions or 
tasks which an organization trains and prepares for. 
Functional specialization, as used in this study, is 
closely related to the concepts of standard operating 
procedures (SOPs), programs, and repertoires in organization 
theory. 17 Organization theory defines SOPs as simple rules 
for accomplishing routine tasks. Programs are a collection 
of SOPs grouped together to accomplish a more complex task, 
and a repertoire is the sum total of programs available 
within an organization. Thus, an organization's repertoire 
is roughly analogous to its functional specializationi Both 
16 See Allison, p. V and pp. 67-100. See also Posen, pp. 13-34, and Builder, pp. 31-43, 57-66, and 104-
114. 
17 See Allison, p. 83, and Posen, pp. 45-46. 
14 
represent the tasks for which the organization is trained 
for and prepared to deal with. 
3. Implications For Integration 
How do these concepts of organizational culture and 
functional specialization affect the process of integration 
at the strategic level? Organization Theory suggests that 
they have several effects. 
a. The Effects of Culture 
Organizational culture affects integration at the 
strategic level in two ways. First, it influences both the 
commander's and his supporting staff's perceptions of a 
problem. As mentioned before, organizational culture acts 
as a perceptual lens through which members of an 
. . . th ld 18 organ1zat1on v1ew e wor . As such, it affects the way 
individuals socialized within a certain culture perceive 
problems. This is one of the underlying concept behind the 
familiar adage, "where you stand depends on where you sit." 
General Eisenhower once said: 
War is taking any problem exactly as you take a 
problem of your own life, stripping it down to its 
essentials, determining for yourself what is 
important and what you can emphasize to the 
advantage of your side; what you can emphasize 
that will be to the disadvantage of the other; 
making a plan accordingly--and then fighting just 
18 Allison, p. v. 
15 
as hard as you know how, 
distract you from the 
. 19 
concept1on. 
never letting anything 
prosecution of that 
The problem is, however, that variations in 
organizational culture suggest that SOF and GPF commanders 
and staffs are likely to "strip down" the same problem 
differently. 
Second, organizational culture affects commanders and 
staffs preferences for solutions. Once again, socialization 
within a culture establishes certain underlying beliefs 
about cause and effect relationships. Thus, individuals 
with one set of understandings about the causes of a 
particular problem are likely to prefer a different solution 
than those with a different set of understandings. To 
return to General Eisenhower's words, individuals with 
different organizational cultures are likely to have 
different ideas about what is "essential" and what can be 
"emphasized" to the "advantage of his own side," and 
"emphasized to the disadvantage of the other." Thus, SOF and 
GPF commanders and staffs might be expected to prefer 
different solutions to the same problem. 
19 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Command in War," speech given at the National War College, 30 October 
1950. 
16 
b. The Effects of Functional Specialization 
Functional specialization also affects the process 
of integration at the strategic level. In Essence of 
Decision, Allison demonstrates that an organization's past 
experience and current repertoire influence the way in which 
20 it searches for solutions to new problems. 
In searching for solutions to new problems, 
organizations, and individuals within organizations, tend to 
search in the neighborhood of previous solutions. 21 This 
implies that the past experience of an organization 
influences the way in which it approaches problem solving. 
It represents essentially an "if you are not sure what to 
do, do what you know" mentality and search method. Thus, 
even if SOF and GPF perceived a problem in the same way, 
their solutions would likely be different and reflect each 
organizations past experience. Allison also demonstrates 
that an organization's current repertoire affects its search 
for solutions to new problems. As he says: 
Where situations can not be construed as 
standard, ... the style of search and its stopping 
point are largely determined by existing 
routines. 22 
20 Allison, p. 84. 
21 Ibid., p. 72. 
22 Ibid., p. 84. 
17 
One might expect, then, that GPF organizations would 
design solutions consistent with their functional 
specialization and SOF organizations would do the same. 
Since the two have very different functional 
specialization's, the nature of their respective solutions 
should be very different as well. 
4. The Nature of Military Operations 
Business organizations often attempt to avoid the 
problem solving challenges posed by organizational culture 
and functional specialization by forming working groups 
comprised of members from different 
working together on an equal footing. 
sub-organizations 
For example, two 
department heads, from two different sub-organizations, 
might co-chair a working group. The group might consisting 
of five members of each department, tasked with solving a 
particular problem. This power-sharing 
minimizes the problems of culture and 
specialization and facilitates effective search. 
arrangement 
functional 
The hierarchical nature of military operations and the 
command structure in which they are executed, however, 
prevent such power-sharing arrangements. Military 
operations require that one or the other organization be in 
18 
charge. This applies to both joint and integrated 
operations. Since the problems of culture and functional 
specialization can not be minimized the way they are in 
business, choosing the organization who's culture and 
functional specialization most closely match the nature of 
the problem is critical. This is widely recognized in joint 
operations. Operations conducted primarily on land are 
usually commanded by the army; those conducted primarily at 
sea, by the Navy, and so on. However, little consideration 
seems to be given to differences in culture and 
specialization, as they pertain to SOF and GPF, in 
integrated operations. This shortfall becomes especially 
important in unconventional warfare operations. 
F. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
Before laying out how this study will address the 
question of integration in unconventional warfare it is 
appropriate to say a brief word about terminology. The term 
"unconventional warfare" as it has been used thus far 
obviously encompasses a large volume of threats and 
missions. It is, in essence, a sort of catch-all term into 
which almost everything except nuclear and mid/high 
19 
intensity conflict are thrown. 23 Both DOD and scholars have 
recently used other terms, such as low intensity conflict 
and OOTW, to describe similar types of conflict, but 
unconventional warfare is, for reasons discussed in chapter 
II, a more analytically useful term and thus will be used 
throughout this study. 
The purpose of this study, as mentioned earlier, is to 
examine the process of integration of GPF and SOF at the 
strategic level, in unconventional warfare. As mentioned 
above, however, unconventional warfare is a very broad area. 
Army and Air Force doctrine divides unconventional warfare 
into four broad categories; they are support for insurgency 
and counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, peacekeeping 
operations 1 and peacetime contingency operations. In order 
to limit the scope to a manageable size, this stud~ will 
focus on insurgency and counterinsurgency as a 
representative category of unconventional warfare. While 
all the services are involved in unconventional warfare, and 
in particular insurgency and counterinsurgency, to some 
extent, the primary responsibility for it falls to the army 
23 See Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Uri Ra'anan, William J. Olson, Igor Lukes, ed., 
Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency· U S.-Soviet Policy in the Third World, (Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books, DC Heath and Company, 1989), pp. 16-17. 
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as the service responsible for land warfare. As a result, 
this study will further narrow its scope by focusing on army 
forces and doctrine. 
The reasons for relying on insurgency and 
counterinsurgency as a representative category of 
unconventional warfare are several. First, more scholarly 
work has been done in this area than in any other. 24 
Second, military doctrine with regard to insurgency and 
counterinsurgency is more well defined than it is for the 
other areas. 25 And, finally, the U.S. experience in Vietnam 
provides a case study of sufficient size and duration with 
enough participation by both SOF and GPF, to be 
analytically useful. 
In order to accomplish the stated purpose of this 
study, it is first necessary to examine unconventional 
warfare and determine what differentiates it from 
conventional warfare. Chapter II, will address this task by 
24 The literature on insurgency and counterinsurgency is well established and prolific. Some of the better 
works include Larry Cable, A Conflict of Myths: The Development of American counterinsurgency 
doctrine and the Vietnam War, (New York: New York University Press, 1986) and Unholy Grail: The US 
and the Wars in Vietnam 1965-8, (New York: Routledge, 1991) and work by the RAND Corporation such 
as Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts, 
(Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970). 
25 Over half of Field Manual I 00-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, (Headquarters 
Department of the Army, Washington, DC, December, 1990), is dedicated to insurgency and 
counterinsurgency. The remainder of the manual is divided between terrorism and counterterrorism, 
peacekeeping, and peacetime contingency operations. 
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reviewing both military doctrine and recent scholarly 
literature on the subject. Chapter II concludes by 
advancing the hypothesis that the characteristics of 
unconventional warfare are, in fact, substantially different 
from those of conventional warfare, and pose a significantly 
different problem from that posed by conventional war. 
Chapter III examines GPF and SOF as organizations. It 
specifically considers the organizational culture and 
functional specialization of the two forces. Chapter III 
advances the hypotheses that SOF and GPF are, in fact, 
organizationally distinct, and that SOF are, from an 
organizational perspective, generally better suited to 
dealing with unconventional warfare as it is characterized 
in Chapter II. 
Chapter IV uses the U.S. involvement in Vietnam from 
1954 through 1972 as a case study to test the hypothesis of 
Chapters II and III. This chapter shows a significant 
difference between the strategic approach taken by SOF and 
that taken by the conventional military. It also 
demonstrates that the SOF approach was often more effective 
than the GPF approach. 
22 
Chapter V attempts to draw conclusions about the 
effectiveness of the conventional wisdom concerning 
integrated operations, as it applies to solving 
unconventional warfare problems, based on the analysis of 
the Vietnam case study. This chapter also proposes 
alternative command structures which might significantly 
improve the likelihood of designing effective solutions to 
unconventional warfare challenges. 
23 
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II. THINKING ABOUT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 




A central task of this study is to examine which 
organization, SOF or GPF, is better suited to the task of 
designing solutions to unconventional warfare problems. In 
order to do that, however, it is necessary first to 
understand the task at hand: to answer the question, what 
types of solutions do unconventional warfare problems 
require? The purpose of this chapter, then, is to attempt 
to answer this question. It does so by first discussing 
some of the terminology associated with unconventional 
warfare and defining the types of problems which fall into 
this category. Next, it reviews the requirements for 
solving UW problems as they are outlined in both scholarly 
writing and military doctrine.· Finally, it introduces two 
useful models for thinking about UW and the differences 
between the solutions it requires and those required by 
conventional war. 
26 Larry Cable, lecture to the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict Curriculum at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Summer, 1995. 
25 
B. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS: A ROSE BY MANY OTHER NAMES 
In the twentieth century, both the defense 
establishment and scholars have used a plethora of terms to 
describe the types of conflict with which this study is 
concerned. Recently, the two most popular have been low 
intensity conflict and operations other than war. One may 
wonder, therefore, with some degree of legitimacy, why this 
study uses the term unconventional warfare rather than one 
of these more recent terms. While it is not the intent to 
quibble over terms, there are some conceptual reasons for 
preferring UW to either of the aforementioned terms, or, for 
that matter, any of the other terms which have been used in 
the past. While all have generally encompassed the same 
types of operations, some are undoubtedly better than others 
and in the interest of conceptual clarity, UW is used here. 
Prior to World War II, the term most often used to 
describe insurgency, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and 
other forms of stability operations was "small wars. 11 The 
phrase was coined by the Marine Corps in the 1920s and 1930s 
to describe their operations in the Central American "Banana 
Wars. 11 The Marines attempted to institutionalize both the 
term and their experience by publishing the Small Wars 
26 
27 Manual. Although this manual, last published in 1940, 
remains one of the best doctrinal treatments of 
unconventional warfare, both it and the use of the term 
"small wars" disappeared after World War II and have not 
been used since. While the Marines' understanding of· the 
nature of these types of conflicts as reflected in The Small 
Wars Manual was excellent, the term itself has some 
conceptual disadvantages. 
Like the more recent term LIC, it fails to indicate a 
difference in character between "small wars" and "big wars." 
It implies to the observer who is unfamiliar with its 
precise definition only a distinction in size. Therefore, 
one is left to assume that the nature of the problem posed 
by each is the same. This, however, is not the case and, 
combined with the absence of the term from common use for 
the past 50 years, makes "small wars" a poor choice for 
describing the type of conflict with which this study is 
concerned. 
One of the many terms which replaced "small wars" after 
World War II was unconventional warfare. At first the term 
was used only very narrowly to refer to partisan or 
27 The U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, 1940 edition, was reprinted in 1987 as Navy and Marine 
Corps Publication (NAVMC) 2890. 
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insurgent activities in support of U.S. operations in 
conventional war. Army doctrine, which was then the only 
service doctrine concerned with UW, defined it as 
subversion, escape and evasion, and guerrilla warfare. The 
army envisioned employing its newly formed Special Forces to 
conduct UW behind enemy lines in either a nuclear or 
conventional war with the Soviets in Europe. The idea was 
both to conduct directly, and train and organize partisan 
forces to conduct, acts of sabotage against the enemy in 
order to lessen his ability to conduct conventional war. 28 
Current joint doctrine defines unconventional warfare 





warfare and other low visibility, 
clandestine operations as well as 
sabotage, intelligence collection, and 
and Evasion] . 29 
It is still considered to be primarily the job of army 
special forces, although other SOF may assist, and consists 
of offensive operations in support of conventional forces or 
the training and support of friendly insurgents. 
Doctrinally, uw does not include counterinsurgency, 
28 See Russell Weigley, History of the United States Army, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), 
pp. 542-543. See also Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations, (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1958), and Barksdale Hamlett, "Special Forces: Training For Peace and War," Army 
Information Digest, (June, 1961), pp. 2-9. 
29 Doctrine For Joint Special Operations, Joint Publication 3.05, p. 22. 
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counterterrorism, peacekeeping, or any other type of 
stability or nation building operations. 30 These tasks or 
missions, however, have been associated with the term 
unconventional warfare outside the doctrinal arena by both 
politicians and academics. 
In the early 1960s, the Kennedy administration began to 
use the term in a broader sense. Unconventional warfare 
became closely associated with the administrations efforts 
to counter the communist's "wars of national liberation." 
Although army doctrine continued to refer to unconventional 
warfare narrowly as offensive partisan or insurgent 
guerrilla operations, the popular conception of 
unconventional warfare came to include counterinsurgency. 31 
Similarly, professional and scholarly journals began to 
refer to counterinsurgency as unconventional warfare. In 
fact, during the Vietnam war both insurgency and 
counterinsurgency became almost synonymous with 
unconventional warfare. UW is conceptually useful because 
it emphasizes the difference between these types problems 
3
° Counterinsurgency is addressed in Doctrine For Joint Special Operations, Joint Publication 3.05, pp. 
28-32. It is also addressed, along with counterterrorism, peacekeeping, and other forms of stability and 
nation building operations in Field Manuall00-5 Operations, (Department of the Army, June, 1993), 
Chapter 13 and Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pam 3-2, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, 
(Headquarters, Department of the Army and the Air Force, 1990), 
31 See Weigley, History of the United States Army, pp. 542-546. See also Krepinevich, pp. 27-46. 
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and more conventional problems. It suggests that what 
conventional war is, unconventional war is not. 
After Vietnam, however, the term low intensity conflict 
gradually began to replace unconventional warfare. This 
shift to the term LIC for describing insurgency and 
counterinsurgency as well as the emerging missions of 
counterterrorism and peacekeeping was largely precipitated 
by the development of the notion of a "spectrum" of 
conflict. The "spectrum," which first appeared in the 
1970s, divided warfare into high, mid, and low intensity 
conflicts. Nuclear war or conventional war with the Soviets 
constituted high intensity conflict; conventional, inter-
state, war, with any middle power outside of Europe, mid-
intensity conflict; and virtually everything else low 
intensity conflict. 32 
Joint doctrine defines LIC as: 
Political-military confrontation between states or 
groups below conventional war and above the 
routine, peaceful competition among states. It 
frequently involves protracted struggles of 
competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity 
conflict ranges from subversion to the use of 
armed force. It is waged by a combination of 
means employing political, economic, 
informational, and military instruments. Low 
intensity conflicts are often localized, generally 
32 These characterizations of high, mid, and low intensity, conflict are the author's own and are not 
described this way in official doctrine. 
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in the Third World, but contain regional and 
global security implications." 33 (emphasis added) 
Substantively, this definition is as good as any other 
that can be conjured up for describing the type of conflict 
with which this study is concerned, the use of the term low 
intensity conflict, however, creates some analytical 
misperceptions similar to those associated with "small 
wars." It encourages the notion that conflicts at one end 
are simply "more intense" than conflicts at the other, not 
necessarily different. And, as will be demonstrated in the 
next section, this is not the case. 
In the 1990s, the term "operations other than war" 
began to be used as a synonym for LIC. This term, however, 
is, at least conceptually, the least valuable so far. By 
referring to such things as insurgency and counter 
insurgency as something "other than war," is worse, by far, 
than describing it as a "small war," or "low intensity 
conflict." It implies that these problems are somehow not 
as serious as the problem of conventional war, and, in 
reality, nothing· could be further from the truth. The 
insurgency in Vietnam proved very difficult to solve. So 
difficult, in fact, that it never was successfully solved. 
33 FM 100-20, p. 1-1. 
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Similarly 1 the recent problem Somalia posed very 
difficult challenges and it is questionable weather or not 
that problem was satisfactorily solved. 
Unconventional warfare, by process of 
elimination, the logical choice. Unlike LIC or "small war", 
it implies that there is a characteristic difference between 
itself and conventional warfare. Similarly 1 unlike OOTW 1 
the use of the word warfare acknowledges that these types of 
conflict are, in fact, a process of strategic interaction 
between adversaries and that there must be a winner and a 
loser. 
For purposes of this study, then 1 unconventional 
warfare is defined as follows: 
Political-military confrontation between states or 
groups (frequently one of each}below conventional 
war. It frequently involves protracted struggle~ 
including, but not limited to, the use of 
terrorism and guerrilla tactics. Unconventional 
warfare ranges from subversion to the use of 
organized violence and armed force. It is waged 
by a combination of means employing political, 
economic, informational/ and military instruments. 
This is obviously adapted from the definition of LIC 
found in FM 100-20 1 Military Operations Other Than War. The 
operational categories of insurgency and counterinsurgency/ 
counterterrorism, peacekeeping operations 1 and peacetime 
32 
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contingency operations found in FM 100-20 are also useful 
and will be applied to UW in this study as well. This is 
not to say, however, that all peacekeeping and peacetime 
contingencies are UW. Some may resemble conventional 
conflict much more closely. It is also worth repeating 
that UW, as defined and used in this study, is not the same 
way UW is defined and used in joint doctrine. The doctrinal 
definition is much narrower. 
C. SOLVING A UW CHALLENGE 
The idea that the challenge posed by UW is somehow 
different in character from that posed by conventional 
warfare and that UW requires a different sort of solution is 
certainly nothing new to Americans. As noted earlier, 
President Kennedy believed in 1962 that combating communist 
"wars of national liberation" required "a whole new kind of 
strategy" as well as "a wholly different kind of force. " 34 
Even before the threat of communist expansion through the 
use of UW existed, the marine corps recognized there was a 
difference between conventional, "big wars," and what it had 
been doing in Latin America. The 1940 version of the Small 
Wars Manual states: 
34 Weigley, The American Way of War, p. 456, see also Krepinevich, p. 27-33. 
33 
Since the [First] World War there has been a flood 
of literature dealing with the old principles 
illustrated and the new techniques developed in 
that war; but there always have been and ever will 
be other wars of an altogether different kind, 
undertaken in very different theaters of 
operations and requiring entirely different 
methods from those of the World War. 35 
Even today, with regard to the role of U.S. forces in 
Bosnia, there are constant references to a "different" role 
for the military as the following excerpt from a recent 
newspaper article points out: 
With 20,000 Americans flowing into Bosnia-
Herzegovina, officers such as [Army captain Mike] 
Kasales, often the first U.S. soldiers into an 
area, have quickly become mini-ambassadors, quick-
study diplomats who are playing a key role in 
determining the success of the peacekeeping 
effort. This, the experts say, is not a generals 
war ... Its like a cavalry mission from the 1800s 
and they are taming the Wild, Wild West. 36 
Thus, the "gut feeling" is that UW requires a different 
solution than conventional war. This "feeling" is, in fact, 
borne out by the evidence. 
Since the end of World War II, a prolific literature in 
the field of UW has developed. Inspired largely by the 
conflicts associated with the breakdown of Europe's overseas 
empires and the U.S. failure in Vietnam, this literature 
35 Small Wars Manual, p. 8 
36 Nora Zamichow, "Captains Courageous Enough Not to Fight," Los Angeles Times, January 23, 1996, p. 
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highlights the fact that UW requires substantially different 
solutions from conventional 37 war. Robert Asprey, for 
example, in War in the Shadows, asserts that the historical 
record of UW and guerrilla tactics clearly demonstrates 
those who have attempted to apply conventional solutions to 
UW problems have consistently failed. 38 
Current doctrine, likewise, confirms the "feeling" that 
UW requires a different type of solution. The army' s FM 
100-5 Operations, for example, lists the principles of 
conventional war as: objective; offensive; mass; economy of 
force; maneuver; unity of command; security; surprise; and 
simplicity. In the manual's discussion of OOTW, it retains 
objective and security, modifies unity of command to read 
unity of effort, and adds legitimacy, perseverance, and 
restraint. 39 This difference in principles between 
conventional and unconventional war would seem to suggest a 
difference in solutions. 
What, then, are the differences between the solutions 
required for UW and those required for conventional war? 
37 Some of the scholarly works which support the notion that UW requires different solutions than 
conventional war are: Krepinevich; Cable; and Robert A. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in 
History, (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1975). The best doctrinal manual for highlighting the 
differences is FM 100-20. 
38 Asprey, p. xii. 
39 FM 100-5, pp. 2-4 to 2-6 and 13-3 to 13-4. 
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While the literature and doctrine cover a wide range of 
operations and activities, from insurgency and 
counterinsurgency to peacekeeping, and while each category 
and each operation is somewhat unique, a basic trend in 
solutions does emerge. That trend is that in conventional 
war, victory depends on defeating the enemy's armed forces 
in battle while in UW, it tends to depend less on victory on 
the battlefield, and more on disabling the enemy's 
operational system and depriving him of popular support. 
This is perhaps most clearly and poignantly illustrated in 
the now famous conversation between Harry Summers and a 
North Vietnamese counterpart: 
~You know you never defeated us 
battlefield," said the American colonel. 
on the 
The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark 
a moment. ~That may be so," he replied ~but it is 
also irrelevant." 40 
This UW requires a more indirect solution than 
conventional conflicts is almost universally reflected in 
the literature. Larry Cable, for example, with respect to 
insurgency, has stated: 
While all warfare is political, insurgency is 
purely a contest of political will. Military 
operations are relevant only in so far as they 
40 Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, (Novato, CA: Presidio 
Press, 1982), p. 1. 
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have a direct, substantial, and measurable effect 
upon the political will of the contestants and 
upon the uncommitted majority of the population. 
Thus while the clich~ "firepower kills" is true, 
it is impossible to kill one's way to victory in 
• . 41 
an lnsurgent envlronment. 
Similarly, Andrew Krepinevich, in discussing guerrilla 
warfare as it pertains to insurgency states: 
In conventional wars, strategy prescribes the 
conquest of the enemy's territory, yet this seldom 
occurs prior to the destruction of the enemy's 
armed forces in battle. These rules do not apply, 
however, against an enemy who refuses to fight for 
territory. In an insurgency, the way to destroy 
the insurgent is to attack him at the source of 
his strength: the population. 42 
The indirect trend in UW solutions, in addition to 
being prevalent in the literature is also prevalent in 
current doctrine for UW. FM 100-20 Military Operations in 
Low Intensity Conflict, for example, lists the "Low 
Intensity Conflict Imperatives" as: political dominance; 
unity of 
43 perseverance. 
effort; adaptability; legitimacy; and 
Conspicuously absent are some of the 
principles of conventional war such as offensive, mass, and 
maneuver. The manual also points out that military 
operations must often be restrained and that commanders must 
41 Larry Cable, "Straddling the Cultural Gaps: Special Forces in the Indirect Action Environment," in 
Special Warfare, January, 1996, p. 12. 
42 Krepinevich, p. 10. 
43 FM 100-20, p. 1-5. 
37 
consider the psychological effects on the population as well 
as the tactical effects on the opponent. It also points out 
h h f k . . h 1 44 t at t e ormer must ta e pr1or1ty over t e atter. 
While it is possible to go on quoting from the 
literature and doctrine at length, it may be more useful to 
discuss some of the dynamics of UW which make an indirect 
solution more appropriate and necessary. 
First, the choice of a UW strategy often results from a 
position of weakness. It is generally a tool of the weak 
against the strong. This may not be categorically true, but 
it is true in most cases, especially insurgency and 
terrorism. This fact implies the weaker contestant must 
avoid direct military confrontation in order to survive. He 
seeks to win not by overpowering the stronger opponent, but 
by eroding his will to fight or his ability to exercise 
control. To do this, he uses clandestine, underground 
organizations, irregular forces, and guerrilla and terror 
tactics. 45 
In order to avoid destruction by the stronger opponent, 
these organizations and forces must either hide physically, 
44 Ibid., pp. 1-9 to 1-11. 
45 Clandestine organizations and irregular forces can be either non-state organizations and guerrilla, 
terrorist, or partisan forces or regular military organizations and forces operating in an irregular manner. 
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or remain anonymous within the larger population. Of these 
two choices, however, only remaining anonymous within the 
population allows him to be effective. As Malaya and the 
Philippines have demonstrated, if irregular forces and 
organizations can be isolated from the population they· can 
easily be defeated or rendered irrelevant. 46 Thus achieving 
anonymity is vital to the success of the weaker belligerent. 
Hiding behind a "veil of anonymity" 47 allows the weaker 
belligerent not only to survive, but maintain the initiative 
as well. By remaining anonymous, he is able to fight only 
when he chooses and only if he can afford to lose. This, in 
turn, has significant implications for the strategy of the 
stronger belligerent. 
The stronger belligerent faces somewhat of a dilemma 
when it comes to employing his military force. He could 
easily destroy the opponent if he could effectively target 
him. The problem is, he cannot. This leaves him with 
essentially two options, he can wait for the opponent to 
come to him or he can attempt to "pierce the veil." 
46 For a detailed account of the Malayan case, see Asprey, Vol. II, pp. 858-873. For the Philippines, see 
Asprey, pp. 818-832. See also Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A study of Peasant Revolt in the 
Philippines, (Berkley: University of California Press, 1977). 
47 The term "veil of anonymity" is taken from lectures presented by Gordon McCormick at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, Summer, 1995. 
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The first option is likely to result in two problems. 
First, waiting for the opponent to come to him means he will 
never be able to inflict losses on the opponent which are 
larger than the opponent is willing to bear. 48 Second, 
since he cannot effectively identify the opponent the use of 
force is likely to be indiscriminate. This is 
counterproductive. In the process of killing ten guerrillas 
he may create forty more thus exacerbating his problem. 
The stronger belligerent must therefore attempt to 
"pierce the veil." This is obviously the more effective 
method, the question is how is that done? 
It is essentially a question of intelligence; 
intelligence obtained not through imagery, sensors, and 
other high tech devices, but from human sources. After all, 
the problem is not finding the opponent physically, it's 
~eparating him from the population at large. The required 
intelligence can be obtained in essentially two ways, both 
of which involve the general population. First, it can be 
obtained by increasing the popular perceived legitimacy of 
the stronger belligerent. 49 This is essentially convincing 
48 For a more complete discussion of the problems of anonymity and a strategy of attrition in guerrilla 
conflict see W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzle, The Lessons of Vietnam, (New York: Crane 
Russak & Co., 1977), Chapter V. 
49 The term "popular perceived legitimacy" is take Larry Cable, "Straddling the Cultural Gaps," p. 11. 
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the population that they should support you, the stronger 
belligerent, who already has de facto control, rather than 
the opponent, the guerrillas or irregulars who operate in 
their midst. Increasing perceived legitimacy will 
effectively increase the likelihood that the population will 
"turn-in" the guerrillas and separate them from their base 
of support. Increasing perceived legitimacy requires the 
employment of effective psychological operations (psyops), 
civic action programs designed to alleviate any real or 
perceived grievances, and an ability to protect the 
population from reprisals by the opponent. These, in turn, 
require effective political leadership, a detailed 
historical and cultural understanding of the society, and an 
effective presence within the population linked to an 
ability to respond rapidly with force. 
The second way of obtaining the intelligence required 
to "pierce the veil" is by controlling the population. This 
may require "emergence measures" such as restricting 
movement, curfews, and even relocation. The goal of such 
measures is to deprive the guerrilla or irregular the 
ability to move freely in and out of the population. This 
method is again demonstrated in examples provided by Malaya, 
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the Philippines, and, more recently, by the methods of the 
3rd Special Forces Group in Haiti. This method requires, 
once again, an effective presence and an understanding of 
history, culture, and society. 
The methods described above for identifying the 
opponent are also effective for separating him from his 
logistics base, to the extent he is supported internally. 
Irregular forces, just like regular forces, must eat and 
obtain other supply requirements. Their clandestine nature, 
however, prevents them from establishing an overt logistics 
system. They therefore must rely either on a covet, 
external system, or an internal system of supply through the 
population. Increasing perceived legitimacy, as discussed 
above, will make the population less willing to support the 
irregulars. Similarly, controlling the population will make 
?Upporting them more difficult. 
To the extent that it is necessary for the stronger 
belligerent to separate the weaker from the population in 
order to succeed, the weaker must likewise remain connected. 
In this sense, he must try to do the same tasks, only in 
42 
reverse. That is he must increase his perceived legitimacy 
and increase his control over the population. 50 
D. TWO MODELS FOR THINKING ABOUT UW 
The dynamics of UW are, to say the least, complex. The 
above discussion highlights some of those dynamics and 
explains somewhat the nature of the solutions required for 
UW problems, but is by no means comprehensive. Indeed, it 
attempts to relay in a few pages the most important parts of 
an entire literature. It is useful, therefore to provide 
the following two models for thinking about UW. Although 
both were designed specifically for insurgency, they are, to 
a large degree, generalizable to UW as a whole. 
The first is a rather simple, but extremely useful 
model for thinking about the dynamics of UW. Developed by 
Dr. Gordon McCormick, it is lightly referred to as the 
"mystic triangle," or triangulus mysticus 51 (see Figure 1) 
The model highlights the fact that UW is largely a 
competition for control of the population (labeled Society 
in the diagram) and that military efforts alone are 
50 The concepts in this discussion ofUW dynamics are derived from a class on revolutionary warfare 
taught by Gordon McCormick at the Naval Postgraduate School in the summer of 1995. Special thanks to 
Dr. McCormick for explaining his ideas in detail and helping with the formulation of this section. 
51 The Mystic Triangle was developed by Dr. Gordon McCormick and presented in a class on low 
intensity conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, in the summer of 1995. Both the 
Triangle and the description of its dynamics are taken from this class. 
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ineffective. It allows one to visualize the essential 
components of strategy for both belligerents (Because the 
model was designed for insurgency/ belligerents are labeled 
state and counter-state in the diagram, they could, however, 
represent any two belligerents in a UW environment). Each 
arrow in the diagram represents a necessary component of an 
effective strategy. The arrow along the base of the 
triangle represents the military and paramilitary activities 
of each side. It should again be emphasized that 
discriminate and measured application of force is important 
for both sides. The arrows along the sides of the triangle 
represent the importance of population control. Again/ the 
tools for affecting these legs are presence, civic action, 
and psyops. Finally, the arrows across the middle represent 
efforts to break the oppositions ties to the society. The 





Figure 1. Mystic Triangle Model 
As stated, this model is simple, but it provides a 
handy tool for thinking about the dynamics of UW. It is 
simple enough to be remembered easily and applied 
cognitively as one examines case studies. For this reason, 
it is offered here. 
The second model, taken from the work of Nathan Leites 
and Charles Wolf, is slightly more complex. 52 This model, 
52 This model and the description of its dynamics and implications for strategy are taken directly from 
Leites and Wolf, pp. 32-37. 
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like the mystic triangle, is extremely useful for thinking 
about the components of UW strategy and the strategic 
alternatives available to counter a UW threat. 
The Leites and Wolf model views insurgency as a system 
(see Figure 2) . The model begins by recognizing that an 
insurgent organization, or, indeed, the weaker belligerent, 
requires certain inputs. These inputs, recruits, food, 
shelter, money, and material, for example, must be obtained 
from either internal or external sources. The mix between 
external and internal inputs is variable and unique in each 
case. These inputs are, in turn, used by the organization 
to generate certain outputs or activities. Outputs and 
activities include acts of sabotage, violence against 
individuals, and small scale attacks against the state as 
well as the exercise of administrative control over the 
population. The objective of the insurgents outputs is to 
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CONVERSION MECHANISM 
Figure 2. 
Organizational production functon 




53 Leites/Wolf System Model 
Viewing insurgency or UW as a system allows one to 
identify four distinct counter strategies. The first is to 
raise the weaker belligerent's cost for obtaining inputs. 
The aim of this strategy is essentially to deny the 
organization the inputs it needs to produce outputs. 
Examples of this strategy include interdiction of supplies 
with direct military force or attempts to build barriers 
53 This diagram ofLeites' and Wolfs model is modified slightly from the original. 
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that impede the movement of people and supplies from the 
source to the destination. 
The second strategy is to impede the process by which 
the weaker belligerent converts inputs to outputs or, in 
other words, reduce the efficiency of his organizational 
production process. This strategy essentially targets the 
organizational infrastructure. Examples of such a strategy 
include creating distrust and friction within the 
organization by planting rumors; attracting defectors or 
turning high level operatives; and conducting an effective 
psyops campaign by disseminating credible misinformation 
about the organization's motives and behavior. 
The third strategy 
belligerent's outputs. 
counter-force strategy. 
is to destroy the weaker 
This is the more traditional 
It is important to remember, 
however, that an effective counter force strategy requires 
the discriminate application of force. This, in turn, 
requires detailed intelligence and a restrictive use of 
firepower. 
The fourth strategy is to reduce the effects of the 
weaker belligerent's outputs or activities on both the 
stronger belligerent and the population. This essentially 
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entails increasing both the stronger belligerent's and the 
population's ability to absorb punishment. This strategy 
has two components. The first involves such measures as 
hardening villages, increasing the strength and 
effectiveness of police and other paramilitary forces and 
relocating the population so that it is less accessible to 
the weaker belligerent. The second component involves 
effective completion of civic programs designed to increase 
the stronger belligerent's legitimacy and weaken grievances 
the weaker belligerent may be using to undermine the 
stronger and increase its own strength. 
Taken together, the mystic triangle model and the 
Leites/Wolf model provide a more comprehensive way of 
looking at the differences between UW and conventional war 
and the nature of effective solutions for each. They are 
therefore offered here as useful tools that can be used to 
help analyze the process of integration at the strategic 
level. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter has attempted to cover a considerable 
amount of ground. It has attempted to convey concepts and 
dynamics which are, as mentioned previously, the subject of 
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a rather exhaustive literature. It is useful, therefore, to 
briefly review some of the main points. 
First, UW, as defined in this study, is: 
Political-military confrontation between states or 
groups below the level of conventional war. 
As such, the nature of the effective solutions for UW 
is significantly different from the nature of the solutions 
for conventional conflict. 
Second, the fundamental difference between the 
solutions for UW and conventional war is that victory in UW 
depends less on destruction of the enemy's armed forces in 
battle and more on destroying his operating system by 
"piercing the veil" and separating him from his base of 
support. 
Finally 1 effectively solutions which accomplish the 
task of destroying the enemy's operating system and 
separating him from his base of support require several 
things; Chief among them are intelligence, a detailed 
understanding of the history, culture and society in which 
the conflict occurs 1 and a highly discriminate use of force. 
Solutions to UW are essentially intelligence rich/ and force 
poor. 
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III. CHARACTERIZING THE ORGANIZATIONS 
War is taking any problem exactly as you take a 
problem of your own life, stripping it down to its 
essentials, determining for yourself what is 
important and what you can emphasize to the 
advantage of your side; what you can emphasize to 
the disadvantage of the other; making a plan 
accordingly--and then fighting just as hard as you 
know how, never letting anything distract you from 
the prosecution of that conception. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower54 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter II has reviewed the kinds of solutions required 
for UW, the next step is to review the tools available for 
crafting those solutions. 
In Chapter I, the role of organizational culture and 
functional specialization in integrated operations was 
spelled out. As discussed there, the perceptions, beliefs, 
and past experience of an organization can affect the way it 
views and thinks about problems. This, in turn, can affect 
its approach to solving problems. Understanding an 
organization's culture and specialization can help both to 
explain and predict behavior. The question, then, is what 
are the organizational cultures and functional 
specialization of SOF and GPF? What "lens" does each look 
54 Eisenhower speech. 
51 
through when it "strips down 11 a problem and what 
capabilities does it believe it can "emphasize" to solve it? 
This chapter explores these quest ions by first 
examining the organizational culture and functional 
specialization of each organization, and then examining how 
these cultures and specialties might effect the formulation 
of campaign plans and strategy in integrated operations. 
B. GPF AS AN ORGANIZATION 
As an organization, GPF displays both a distinct 
culture and specialization. Although both have changed 
slightly over the course of American military history, the 
current culture and specialization of GPF have remained 
constant through most of the twentieth century and have/ for 
the most part, been reinforced by their experience over the 
past SO years. 
1. Organizational Culture 
The organizational culture of GPF has 1 at its roots 1 
the principles of total victory and destruction of the 
enemyts armed forces through the use of overwhelming 
f . 55 1repower. This culture has grown out of GPF 1 S experience 
55 Weigley, although he does not refer specifically to organizational culture, chronicles well the GPF 
belief in overwhelming force through the use offrrepower, mass, and mobility in The American Way of 
War. 
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fighting the nation's wars, and is clearly reflected in 
current doctrine. 
The origins of GPF culture can be traced all the way 
back to the Civil War. That war was America's first total 
war, and the strategy of annihilation employed by Ulysses S. 
Grant in his relentless pursuit of the Southern army, its 
first taste of overwhelming force. 56 
The translation of Clausewitz into English in 1873 and 
his subsequent popularity among American military officers 
also helped to develop the culture of GPF. For Clausewitz, 
the center of gravity in war was unquestionably the 
destruction of the enemy's armed forces. In On War, he 
states: 
The destruction of the enemy's armed forces, 
amongst all the objects which can be pursued in 
war, appears always as the one which overrules all 
others. The destruction of the enemy's military 
force, is the leading principle of war, and for 
the whole chapter of positive action the direct 
h b . 57 way to t e o Ject. 
Clausewitz also supports the notion that if force is 
used, it should be used in an overwhelming manner. 
Now philanthropists may easily imagine there is a 
skillful method of disarming and overcoming an 
enemy without causing great bloodshed, and that 
56 Weigley, The American Way of War, p. xx. 
57 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. By Sir Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), p. I, 44-45. 
53 
this is the proper tendency of the Art of War. 
However plausible this may appear, still it is an 
error which must be extirpated; ... To introduce 
into the philosophy of war itself a principle of 
moderation would be an absurdity. 58 
Thus the popularity of Clausewitzian theory tended to 
reinforce the culture which had begun to develop out of the 
Civil war, especially the principle of destruction of the 
enemy's armed forces through the application of overwhelming 
force. GPF's experience in the first half of the twentieth 
century would do even more to reinforce the emerging 
culture. 
World Wars I and II were, like the Civil War, total 
wars. The objective, was, in Clausewitzian terms, the 
complete overthrow of the enemy, and destruction of his 
armed forces, through the use of overwhelming force, was the 
avenue through which this goal was pursued. Thus by 1945, 
_the GPF culture, based on the aforementioned principles, was 
well established. 
Since 1945 this overwhelming force culture has 
persisted basically unchanged. This is evidenced by events 
in Korea, the development of what Gordon Craig and Alexander 
George have called the Never-Again School, the publication 
58 Ibid., pp. I, 2-3. 
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of On Strategy by Harry Summers in 1981, the development of 
the Weinberger Doctrine in 1984, and the emergence of the 
"Powell Doctrine" following the Persian Gulf War. 59 
In many ways Korea clearly demonstrates GPF culture. 
General MacArthur's famous statement "There is no substitute 
for victory ... War's very objective is victory" demonstrates 
his belief, in particular, and GPF's belief in general that 
if America were going to engage in war, then it should 
engage in nothing short of total 60 war. Furthermore, his 
belief that massive air power and nuclear weapons should be 
used against China clearly demonstrate the overwhelming 
61 force concept. The cultural preference for total war and 
the expectation of total victory is also demonstrated by 
comments made by General Mark Clark. In July 1953, shortly 
after the signing of the armistice, he told reporter~ at a 
news conference "I cannot find it in me to exult in this 
hour. " 62 
59 The Never-Again School is a phrase coined by Gordon Craig and Alexander George in Force and 
Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, Third Edition, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) 
Chapter 19, The Role of Force in Diplomacy, A Continuing Dilemma for US. Foreign Policy. Harry 
Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1981), and 
Casper Weinberger's speech to the National Press Club in Washington DC on November 28, 1984 as cited 
in Defense, January, 1985 pp. 2-8, also provide evidence ofthe overwhelming force culture ofGPF. 
60 Weigley, The American Way of War, p. 391. 
61 Ibid., p. 390. 
62 Cited in Krepinevich, p. 16. 
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The frustration felt by General Clark and other top 
ranking military officers, as well as· the American people, 
lead to the development of the Never-Again School . 63 This 
School essentially stipulated that America should not limit 
its use of force in war. It should only become involved if 
it was willing to use any means necessary, including nuclear 
weapons, to win decisively. This school of thought is 
partially responsible for the doctrine of Massive 
Retaliation developed by the Eisenhower administration. The 
Never-Again School both provides evidence of the total 
war/overwhelming force culture of GPF as it existed in the 
1950s, and served to strengthen that culture even more. 
More recent evidence of the overwhelming force culture 
can be found in Harry Summers' On Strategy, and the 
Weinberger Doctrine, both of which are, to a certain degree, 
an extension of the Never-Again School to the post-Vietnam 
era. Summers, who's book is· used as text at the Army 
Command and General Staff College, the Army, Air, and Naval 
War Colleges, and the National Defense University, 
hypothesizes that the U.S. lost in Vietnam in part because 
63 Craig and George, Chapter 19. See also Weigley, The American Way of War, p. 451, and Krepinevich, 
p. 16-17. 
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it failed to take into account the lessons of Korea. 64 He 
argues that because the U.S. failed because it did not fight 
a total war against North Vietnam. Political restraints, he 
argues, prevented the effective application of overwhelming 
force, and thus contributed to the U.S. failure. 65 Whether 
or not one agrees with Summers, the analysis, and the 
popularity with which it is received among GPF, point to the 
continued dominance of the overwhelming force culture. 
Similarly, the Weinberger doctrine indicates the 
continued dominance of the total war/overwhelming force 
mentality. On November 28, 1984, Weinberger, then Secretary 
of Defense in the Reagan Administration, elaborated six 
"tests" which should be considered before the U.S. commits 
military forces in support of foreign policy. They are: 
1. The United States should not commit forces to 
combat overseas unless the particular engagement 
or occasion is deemed vital to our national 
interest or that of our allies. 
2. If we decide it is necessary to put combat 
troops into a given situation, we should do so 
wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of 
winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces 
or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, 
we should not commit them at all. 
3. If we do decide to commit forces to combat 
overseas, we should have clearly defined political 
and military objectives. And we should know 
precisely how our forces can accomplish those 
64 Summers, pp. 13-17. 
65 Ibid., pp. 170-173. 
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clearly defined objectives. And we should have, 
and send, the forces needed to do just that. 
4. The relationship between our objectives and 
the forces we have committed--their size, 
composition, and disposition--must be continually 
reassessed and adjusted if necessary. 
5. Before the United States commits combat forces 
abroad there must be some reasonable assurance we 
will have the support of the American people and 
their elected representatives in Congress. This 
support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in 
making clear the threats we face; the support 
cannot be sustained without continuing and close 
consultation. 
6. The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should 
be a last resort. 66 
Several of Weinberger's tests, especially 2, 3, and 4, 
closely resemble Summers' lessons from On Strategy and 
reflect the overwhelming force principle. Michael Handel 
has asserted that Summers' work, in fact, had an impact on 
Weinberger's formulation of these tests. 67 Once again, as 
in the case of On Strategy, the Weinberger Doctrine is not 
only a manifestation of GPF culture, it also reinforces that 
culture by adding the prestige and weight of the Secretary 
of Defense. 
Finally, the most recent evidence that the total 
war/overwhelming force culture of GPF is alive and well is 
the development of what has come to be known as the Powell 
66 Weinberger in Defense, pp. 2-8. 
67 Michael Handel, Masters of War: Sun Tzu Clausewitz and Jomini, (Portland Oregon: Frank Cass , 
1992), p.l60. 
58 
doctrine in the wake of the Persian Gulf War. Powell, who 
spent his career as a GPF officer, and, incidentally, was 
Weinberger's military assistant in 1984, established four 
criteria for the use of military force which appeared in an 
article by Edwin J. Arnold Jr., in the Spring, 1994 issue of 
Parameters. They are: 
1. Force should only be used as a last resort. 
2. Military force should be used on+y when there 
is a clear cut military objective. 
3. Military force should be used only when we can 
measure that the military objective has been 
achieved. 
4. Military force should be used only in an 
overwhelming fashion. 68 (Emphasis added) 
History and the writing of generals and politicians are 
not the only evidence that GPF culture is dominated by the 
total war/overwhelming force principles. Military doctrine 
also reflects this fact. Joint Pub 1, for example, in 
referring to the object of joint campaigns, states "The 
objective is the employment of overwhelming military 
force1' 69 A second example can be found in the Army's FM 
100-5. The manual states: 
The American people expect decisive victory and 
abhor unnecessary casual ties. They prefer quick 
resolution of conflicts and reserve the right to 
68 Edwin J. Arnold Jr., "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of the National Interest," Parameters, 
Spring 1994, p. 7. 
69 Joint Pub 1, p. 47. 
59 
reconsider their support should any of these 
conditions not be met. 70 
The manual also states: 
The ultimate military purpose of war is the 
destruction of the enemy's armed forces and will 
to fight. 71 
Thus, it is clear that GPF culture centers around the 
principles of total victory and destruction of the enemy's 
armed forces through the application of overwhelming force. 
This culture developed primarily through the wartime 
experience of GPF, especially during World Wars I and II. 
As Weigley points out: 
In the history of American strategy, the direction 
taken by the American conception of war made most 
American strategists, through most of the time 
span of American history, strategists of 
annihilation ... until the strategy of annihilation 
became the American way of war. 72 
Although Korea and Vietnam provided experience which 
ran counter to the culture, GPF culture did not change, 
rather those events were rationalized in terms of the 
culture. As Larry Cable has pointed out, the organizational 
culture of GPF, even after the experience of Vietnam, can be 
characterized by two popular axioms repeated throughout the 
ranks with zeal; they are "shoot move and communicate," and 
7
° FM 100-5, p. 1-3. 
71 Ibid., p. 2-4. 
72 Weigley, The American Way of War, p. xxii. 
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"find, fix, and destroy. " 73 The Persian Gulf war has 
largely reaffirmed the belief in these axioms and the total 
war/overwhelming force principles, making any future change 
in culture unlikely, at least for the immediate future. 
2. Functional Specialization 
The functional specialization of GPF, like their 
culture, is distinct. Although the mission of GPF is, in 
the broadest sense, to fight and win the nations wars, for 
nearly 50 years, GPF have specialized in fighting a war in 
Europe against an overwhelmingly conventional Soviet threat. 
Indeed, this specialization in conventional European war 
goes back further than 50 years, it can be traced all the 
way back to World War I. Since that time, the primary 
contingency for GPF has been to defeat one or another of the 
European powers on a European battlefield. This 
specialization is evidenced by historical example, recent 
scholarly research, and, most powerfully, the type of 
training conducted by GPF. 
That GPF had grown accustomed to war in Europe is 
evident in their experience in Korea. Both the Chinese and, 
73 These expressions are widely known and regarded as tactical axioms within the U.S. Army's 
conventional forces. This particular reference is taken from a lecture delivered to the Special 
Operations/Low Intensity Conflict curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA., in the 
summer of 1995. 
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by extension, the North Koreans placed great emphasis on 
infiltration and encirclement. American forces, accustomed 
to the relatively linear battlefield of Europe, experienced 
great difficulty adjusting to these tactics. They were 
unaccustomed to dealing with an enemy that suddenly appeared 
in rear areas and attacked from several directions at once, 
frequently at night. Additionally, American forces had 
become dependent on roads, high tech radio communications, 
and artillery and other forms of fire support, none of which 
were always available or effective in the Korean terrain. 74 
As Weigley points out: 
By 1950 ... the Army had become so adjusted to 
European war that it had to struggle to cope with 
Korean and Chinese methods ... Its habituation to 
European war sometimes put the American Army in 
Korea approximately in the condition of Braddock's 
75 Regulars on the Monongahela. 
The GPF specialization in European war is also evident 
in a recent RAND corporation study. 76 
it clearly demonstrates that the Army's GPF has focused on a 
war in Europe. It notes, for example, despite the Army's 
assertion that its goal is to be prepared for any world-wide 
74 These points are summarized from Weigley's discussion of U.S. problems in Korea in The History of 
the United States Army, pp. 518·519. 
75 Ibid., p. 519. 
76 John K. Secater, Carl H. Builder, M.D. Baccus, Wayne Madwell, The Army in a Changing World: The 
Role of Organizational Vision, RAND Corporation Study, R·3882·A, June 1990. 
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contingency, its "Focus on high intensity, conflict in 
central Europe is . bl 77 . t 1ncontesta e." It po1n s out that in 
1990, nearly one-quarter of the Army's GPF were forward 
deployed to Europe, nearly another quarter had equipment 
pre-positioned there, and a third quarter's only existing 
contingency plans called for deployment to Europe. The study 
quite correctly states: 
We believe that the Army's thoughts and actions 
reflect a single, dominant, widely shared sense of 
identity and purpose: the instantly ready armored 
defender of central Europe. 78 (emphasis original) 
Finally, the GPF functional specialization for a high 
intensity, European, war is evidenced by their training and 
doctrine. The scenarios employed at the Army's combat 
training centers, for example focus on employing Air land 
Battle Doctrine to defeat a Soviet style force. Scenarios 
used at the National Training Center, (NTC) Ft Irwin, 
California, The Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in 
Germany, and the Joint Readiness Training Center, (JRTC) Ft 
Polk, Louisiana, all focus on combating an opposing force 
modeled on the Soviets and employing Soviet style tactics. 
Even in the wake of the drastically reduced soviet threat, 
77 Ibid., p. 23. 
78 Ibid., p. 23. 
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the scenarios have changed little. At NTC and CMTC, the 
scenarios focus almost exclusively on mid to high intensity 
conflict using conventional, soviet style, forces. 
Typically, a brigade task force conducts both force-on-force 
and live fire training in large scale, armored battles. 
Even at JRTC, which is designed to provide GPF' s light 
forces, the forces most likely to be deployed to UW 
contingencies, a realistic training environment, the 
scenarios typically involve only two or three days of UW 
training followed by a conventional, mid intensity phase. 
Furthermore, the UW training continues to focus solely on 
the destruction of enemy irregular forces in the field. 
Typically, rotations at JRTC involve a two to three day UW 
phase in which GPF forces attempt to combat irregular 
guerrilla forces in an insurgency or other UW environment. 
Although GPF forces typically perform poorly in this 
environment, the opposing force always escalates to mid 
intensity, conventional, Soviet style tactics, which the GPF 
are better prepared to handle. 79 These scenarios and their 
focus on Soviet style opposition clearly reflect GPF's 
specialization in conventional, European war. 
79 The discussion of training center rotations is derived from the scenarios for NTC rotations 92-4, 92-5, 
and 92-6, and JR TC rotations 88-1, 92-1 I, 93-11. 
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C. SOF AS AN ORGANIZATION 
SOF became a permanent part of the force structure in 
the early 1950s. Since that time, they have developed along 
distinct organizational lines within DOD. 
developed an organizational culture and 
They have 
functional 
specialization that is, in several important ways, distinct 
from that of GPF. 
1. Organizational Culture 
The organizational culture of SOF is much less rooted 
in the concept of overwhelming force than that of GPF. SOF, 
even in direct action missions in support of conventional 
forces, eschew the notion of overwhelming force. In these 
missions, they rely instead on a theory of relative 
superiority founded on the principles of surprise, speed, 
detailed intelligence, and precision. 80 In such missions, 
SOF does not so much try to destroy the enemy's forces as 
render them ineffective or irrelevant. SOF culture is 
characterized by two other principles as well. They are 
innovation and flexibility. These cultural traits grow 
largely out of the very nature of special operations and 
evidence of them can be seen not only in the execution of US 
8
° For a complete treatment of the theory of relative superiority, see McRaven, Chapter 1. 
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special operations since the 1950s, but the execution of 
special operations throughout history. 
The nature of special operations is such that they 
usually involve a relatively small force seeking to achieve 
results in disproportion to their size. In defining special 
operations, John Arquilla states: 
[special operations are] that class of military 
(or paramilitary) actions that fall outside the 
realm of conventional warfare during their 
respective time periods. This places significant 
emphasis on the coup de main by small forces whose 
aim is to achieve very substantial effects on the 
course of a war or international crisis. 81 
This fact, that special operations are usually 
conducted by a small (relative to the opponent) force 
implies that overwhelming force and destruction of the 
enemy's forces, in the traditional GPF sense, is unfeasible. 
Instead, SOF must rely on the principles stated above; 
surprise, detailed intelligence, precision, and speed. 
Evidence of this "indirect" approach can be seen in almost 
any special operation. In the 1970 raid on Son Tay prison, 
for example, SOF did not attempt to destroy the air defense 
forces around the prison, but rather distracted and avoided 
them. 82 Similarly, in Operation Source, the 1943 midget 
81 Arquilla, p. ii. 
82 McRaven, p. 297. 
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submarine attack on the German Battleship Tirpitz, the 
British raiders did not attempt to fight their way into 
Kaafjord, they snuck in, relying on • 83 surpr1se. Indeed, 
even as far back as antiquity, Odysseus and the his 
companions relied on an indirect approach to get past the 
gates of 84 Troy. The tradition of overcoming superior 
numbers through the use of various techniques other than 
overwhelming force has led to the development of and 
"indirect approach" culture within SOF. 
The nature of special operations has fostered the 
development of the other two traits mentioned above, 
innovation and flexibility. The fact that special 
operations are, as Arquilla defines them, "outside the realm 
of conventional warfare" implies that they represent an 
unconventional, or innovative, approach. Similarly, the 
fact that special operations rely heavily on surprise for 
mission success fosters innova·tion. Often, surprise can 
best be achieved through the use of new tactics and 
techniques. Evidence of innovation is present in all three 
examples discussed above. In the case of Son Tay, 
innovative "drafting techniques" were developed to increase 
83 Ibid., pp. 201-241. 
84 Arquilla, p. v. 
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85 helicopter ranges. In the Tirpitz raid case, the midget 
submarines were invented specifically for the raid. 86 And 
in the case of Troy, the innovation is obvious! Innovation, 
then, has played a significant role in special operations 
throughout history and has thus become a cultural trait of 
SOF. 
Innovation is closely linked to flexibility. 
Flexibility represents an ability to think creatively and 
adapt existing plans, organizations, and techniques to fit 
the situation. 87 That SOF place a high value on flexibility 
is clearly demonstrated by recent comments made by General 
Downing to Congress. In his statement before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee he stated: 
Since we do not know what future challenges we 
will face, we must create a flexible force that 
can adapt rapidly ... this is as much a problem of 
mindset as it is of unit organization and 
equipment. Our education system is designed to 
inculcate the necessary frame of mind into our OF 
leadership. 88 
He then closed his remarks by relaying the following 
statement, which serves as an example of SOF's high value of 
flexibility. 
85 McRaven, p. 306. 
86 Ibid., p. 202. 
87 FM I 00-20, p. 1-5 to 1-6. 
88 Downing statement, p. 24. 
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In Uganda last year, during the efforts to assist 
the refugees from Rwanda, an Army Special Forces 
captain was tasked to introduce American Aid 
Representatives to the President of Uganda. The 
captain started off the conversation, introducing 
himself and greeting the President in the 
President's own language. This impressed the 
President greatly and smoothed the introduction of 
more difficult topics of discussion ... The captain 
had no specific training. . . on how to deal with 
these specific situations, but he had been through 
a lot of training and had experience with a 
variety of unconventional problems and developed 
the ability to "think outside the box." When 
confronted with yet another unconventional 
89 problem, he was ready. 
To summarize, then, SOF's culture has, at its roots, 
the principles of innovation, flexibility, and a theory for 
the use of force based on relative superiority, rather than 
overwhelming force. 
2. Functional Specialization 
SOF became a permanent part of the force structure 
in 1952 with the formation of the Army's Special Forces. 
Originally, the mission of Special Forces was to conduct, 
and training others to conduct, guerrilla warfare behind 
Soviet lines in the event 90 of a European war. Over the 
past 44 years, however, that narrow specialization has 
expanded to include UW, as defined in the broadest sense, as 
89 Ibid., p. 24 
90 Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 543. 
69 
well as commando-type operations. Of particular interest 
here, of course, is their specialization in UW. Evidence of 
this specialization can be found in the history of SOF since 
1952, current doctrine, and their current training and 
deployments. 
SOF's specialization in UW is clearly seen by examining 
their history. Although SOF was organized in 1952, they 
remained a small force with a limited mission until the 
Kennedy administration took office. Under Kennedy, SOF 
expanded quickly and took on the additional mission of 
. 91 
counter1nsurgency. Although SOF languished somewhat in 
the years after Vietnam, they retained their specialization 
in counterinsurgency and expanded their mission profile 
further. In the 1970s, when international terrorism began 
to rise, SOF added the mission of counterterrorism to their 
repertoire, thus, increasing further their specialization in 
UW. In the late 1980s, SOF underwent a large revitalization 
program at the insistence of Congress. This revitalization 
was intended, among other things to improve the US 
b 'l' . uw 92 capa 1 1ty 1n . Thus, throughout their brief history as 
91 Weigley, The American Way of War, p. 456. See also Krepinevich, pp. 107-112. 
92 Thompson, pp. 12-15. 
70 
a distinct organization within DOD, SOF have continuously, 
and, to a large degree exclusively, been responsible for UW. 
History is reinforced by current doctrine. Joint Publication 
3.05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations lists seven 
doctrinal missions for SOF. Those missions are: Direct 
Action; Special Reconnaissance; Foreign Internal Defense; 
Counterterrorism; Psychological Operations; Unconventional 
Warfare; and Civil Affairs. While direct action and special 
reconnaissance are, admittedly designed primarily for 
supporting GPF in conventional conflicts, the other five 
clearly represent a specialization in UW. 
Finally, SOF's training exercises and deployments 
attest to a specialization in UW, especially with regard to 
Army Special Forces. For example, SOF specific rotations to 
JRTC focus on Foreign internal defense missions to include 
training foreign forces in counterinsurgency. Additionally, 
in fiscal year 1994, SOF teams were deployed to 139 
countries around the world in foreign internal defense of 
other predominately UW roles. 
It is perhaps unfair to suggest that SOF has 
specialized exclusively in UW as it is defined in this 
study. They have not. They have also specialized in 
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commando operations an most SOF units split training time 
between the two types of missions. However, they are 
clearly specialized in UW to a large degree as the above 
discussion indicates and even the commando missions for 
which they train represent an unconventional use of foroe. 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTEGRATED OPERATIONS IN UW 
By combining the discussion of organization theory and 
UW from chapters I and II with the specific organizational 
cultures and functional specialization of SOF and GPF as 
described here, it is possible to develop several hypotheses 
regarding problem solving in integrated operations in UW. 
First, one would expect GPF organizations to design 
solutions consistent with their culture and specialization 
as described in this chapter. That is one would expect them 
to design solutions which focus on victory through the 
defeat of the enemy's armed forces through the use of 
overwhelming force. Additionally, one would expect that 
these solutions would reflect the use of overwhelming force 
as they have conceived of and practiced it in preparation 
for a European war. 
Second, one would expect SOF organizations to design 
solutions consistent with their culture and specialization. 
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That is one would expect SOF to design solutions focused on 
a more indirect approach than those designed by GPF and 
reflecting their understanding of, and specialization in, 
uw. 
Third, in integrated operations, because of the 
hierarchical nature of military operations, one would expect 
the organizational approach of the organization charged with 
command to dominate. 
Finally, because of the nature of UW problems and their 
solutions as discussed in Chapter II, one would expect SOF 
to be generally more effective than GPF in designing 
solutions to UW challenges. 
The next step, then, is to test these hypotheses 
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The American experience in Vietnam provides an 
excellent opportunity to test the hypotheses of Chapter III. 
Several things in particular make the case especially well-
suited to the task. First, the American involvement is of 
sufficient size and duration, and contains enough 
participation by both SOF and GPF to be analytically useful. 
Second, the literature on the case, both historical and 
analytical, is plentiful. 94 Third, Vietnam is far enough in 
the past to allow relatively more objective analysis, 
divorced from some of the emotion and bureaucratic 
influences that sometimes surround more recent cases. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the fact that SOF and 
GPF operated independently in the early years of the war, 
93 Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War: People's Army, as cited in Edgar O'Ballance, The Wars in Vietnam: 
1954-1980, (New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1981) p. 11. 
94 The literature on Vietnam is, indeed, plentiful. Some of the works used in preparation of this case 
include Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986) Larry Cable, A Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and 
the Wars in Vietnam 1965-8, (New York: New York University Press, 1986) Harry Summers, On Strategy: 
A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), Robert A. Asprey, War in the 
Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1975), and Neil Sheehan, A Bright 
Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam, (New York: Random House, 1988). 
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and were later integrated under the command of the Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) allows for clear analysis 
of the SOF approach, the GPF approach, and the integrated 
approach to combating the insurgency in South Vietnam. For 
these reasons, the US experience in Vietnam is the most 
appropriate place to begin to evaluate the influence of 
organizational factors on the process of integration at the 
strategic level. 
B. BACKGROUND 
As implied above, in terms of integration, one can 
divide the American experience in Vietnam into two phases. 
In the first phase, which ran from the mid 1950s to 1963, 
SOF and GPF operated independently. In the second phase, 
which ran from 1963 until the end of the war, the two forces 
were integrated under the unified command and control 
structure of MACV. This section examines the involvement of 
SOF and GPF in both phases of the war. Specifically, it 
focuses on those events which clearly reflect the 
perceptions, strategy, and tactics of SOF, GPF, and the 
integrated force. It should be noted, before diving into 
the case, that what follows is by no means a comprehensive 
historical account of the war in Vietnam. Indeed, to 
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accomplish such in a study of this size and scope would be 
impossible. It is, rather, an attempt to provide a 
framework within which to evaluate the effects of 
organizational culture and functional specialization on the 
development of strategy in Vietnam. 
1. Getting Started: 
American involvement in Vietnam began much earlier 
than many realize. It is common to think of 1965, the year 
large numbers of combat forces were committed, as the 
beginning of America's participation in the war. In 
reality, however, American involvement began with the 
formation of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) 
in 1950. 
Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), began to believe that Indochina was 
~he key to holding Southeast Asia against the communists. 
As a result, they created the MAAG. 95 MAAG' s mission was 
small at first and consisted primarily of providing liaison 
with the French, who were deeply involved in fighting Ho Chi 
Minh's insurgents, and keeping Washington informed. In 
95 Major Stephen L. Bowman, The United States Army and Counterinsurgency Warfare: The Making of 
Doctrine 1946-1964, (M.A. Thesis, Duke University, 1980), p. 23. 
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1954, however, after the infamous French defeat at Dien Bien 
Phu, things began to change. 
The defeat at Dien Bien Phu ensured that the French 
would leave Vietnam and that it would be sooner rather than 
later. As a result, primary responsibility for insuring -the 
security of South Vietnam fell to the United States. As a 
first step towards meeting that new responsibility, the 
National Security Council (NSC) directed the JCS to develop 
a Vietnamese defense force capable of providing internal 
• 96 
secur1ty. determined The that force of JCS a 
approximately 89,000 men would be required to accomplish the 
task97 and the mission of designing and training the force 
was passed on to MAAG. 
In December 1954, the MAAG Chief, Lieutenant General 
(LTG) John W. O'Daniel, and Vietnamese Minister of Defense 
Ho Thong Minh meet to negotiate the force structure. The 
agreement they reached called for the creation of three 
96 In September of 1954 a debate arose in Washington between the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the 
CIA as to the nature of the threat faced by South Vietnam and the type of security forces required to 
counter that threat. The JCS believed the threat was primarily external and that Vietnamese defense forces 
should be organized and trained accordingly. The CIA, particularly Allen Dulles, believed the threat was 
internal and that the defense forces should be organized and trained to deal with the insurgency rather than 
an invasion from the North. The CIA view eventually won out and the JCS were directed to define the 
force levels required for providing internal security. MAAG was the organization ultimately charged with 
developing the resulting 100,000 man force recommended by the JCS and authorized by the NSC. For a 
more complete discussion of this debate see Krepinevich, p. 20. 
97 Krepinevich, p. 20. 
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territorial divisions and three field divisions. 98 The 
territorial divisions consisted of 13 locally trained and 
recruited regiments designed primarily for assisting the 
civil authorities with internal security operations. The 
field divisions, on the other hand, were designed to be more 
"strategically mobile" than the territorial divisions and to 
provide defense against an invasion from the North until 
reinforcements from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO) could be rushed to the scene. Interestingly enough, 
the Diem regime favored the creation of more territorial 
divisions over the heavier field divisions. This 
preference, however, was overridden by MAAG and since the US 
was footing the bill, Diem had little choice but to 
99 
accept. 
Over the next five years, this initial force structure 
changed dramatically. Under the direction of MAAG the Army 
of the Republic of Vietnam evolved into a conventional force 
which mirrored almost exactly the structure and methods of 
operation of the US Army. When the National Security 
Council raised the manpower allocation for the Army of the 
Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) to 150,000 in 1955, MAAG scrapped 
98 Ibid., p. 20-21. 
99 Ibid., p. 22. 
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the three territorial divisions in favor of six new ~light" 
divisions. The light divisions were organized more along 
the lines of American divisions and were no longer 
regionally oriented. One additional field division was 
added, as well, bringing the total number of divisions to 
10: six light and four field. By 1959, more changes had 
occurred. The light divisions had been further transformed 
into ~standard" infantry divisions, which were heavier, and 
the field divisions had become armored cavalry regiments. 
Thus by 1959, the ARVN force structure closely resembled 
that of the US Army. As General Samuel Myers noted: 
We had the TO&Es (tables of organization and 
equipment) of the US translated into Vietnamese 
and issued through the Vietnamese army, and I 
d 11 . . . 100 on't reca any maJor var1at1ons. 
In addition to creating a force which looked like the 
American Army, MAAG created a force which fought like it as 
well. The emphasis in training was on conventional, 
division and corps level, operations. That this was, in 
fact, the case is clearly evidenced by a statement by Major 
General (MG) Ruggles, the deputy MAAG commander from 1957-
100 Interview with General Samuel L. Myers conducted by the Center for Military History, Washington, 
DC, 8 February 1980. Also cited in Krepinevich, p. 23. 
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1959. In referring to LTG Samuel Willaims, the MAAG 
commander who replace O'Daniel, Ruggles stated: 
He was bound that he was going to terminate his 
assignment out there with corps maneuvers 1 because 
that is what he was sent out there to do, organize 
an army that could resist aggression from the 
North. And he had those maneuvers before he left, 
and ... the units did very, very well.~0~ 
As MAAG organized and trained the ARVN, the insurgency 
in South Vietnam continued to grow. The civil authorities 
were increasingly overwhelmed and the ARVN was called on to 
assist in counterinsurgency with ever increasing frequency. 
As a result, MAAG's mission grew from one of simply 
designing and training the ARVN to one of recommending a 
strategy for employing them against the insurgents as well. 
2. Fighting the Insurgency 
In September 1960, LTG Lionel C. McGarr, former 
commandant of the Army's Command and General Staff College 1 
assumed command of MAAG. Faced with the formal 
establishment of the National Liberation Front and the 
activation of the Peoples Liberation Armed Forces in that 
same year, McGarr and MAAG began to develop a 
counterinsurgency plan for 1961. The plan focused primarily 
101 Interview with Major General Ruggles by the Center for Military History, Washington DC, 27 
February 1980. Also cited in Krepinevich, p. 23. 
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~~~~ ---~~~-~~----~-----_;__ _______________________ _ 
on offensive operations designed to destroy guerrilla forces 
in the field. 102 In describing the plan, McGarr wrote that 
the objective was to "find, fix, and finish the enemy." 103 
He further informed the MAAG advisors operating with the 
ARVN that: 
Wars are won through offensive operations. 
Therefore, you must ... bring the VC [Viet Cong 
guerrillas] to battle at a time, place, and in a 
manner of the RVNAF's [Republic of Vietnam Armed 
] h . 104 Forces' c oos1ng. 
In spite of the increased involvement of MAAG and the 
ARVN in counterinsurgency operations and efforts to "find, 
fix, and finish the enemy," the guerrillas continued to gain 
strength. In September 1961, Theodore H. White reported in 
a letter to President Kennedy that: 
The situation gets worse almost week by week. The 
guerrillas now control all the southern delta, so 
much so that I could find no American who would 
drive me outside Saigon in his car even by day 
. h . l. 105 w1t out m1 1tary convoy. 
In response to the worsening situation, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff sought to upgrade MAAG. In November 1961 
they proposed the creation of the Military Assistance 
102 Kr . . h 56 epmev1c , p. . 
103 Commander, MAAG-Vietnam, "Tactics and Techniques for Counterinsurgent Operations," 10 
February 1962, p. 3. Also cited in Krepinevich, p. 57. 
104 BDM Corporation, A Study ofthe Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, Vol. 6, book I, p. 135, 
(McLean, Virginia). Also cited in Krepinevich, p. 58. 
105 Mike Gravel, ed., The Senator Gavel Edition: The Pentagon Papers, 5 Vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1971), Vol. 2, p. 70. 
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Command, Vietnam. The proposal was approved and on February 
8, 1962 MACV was activated under the command of General Paul 
Harkins, an armor officer who had achieved notoriety in 
World War II while serving under George Patton. MACV's role 
was similar to that of its predecessor MAAG. Its mission 
was to "assist the Government of South Vietnam in defeating 
h . . 106 t e commun1st 1nsurgency." 
The approach MACV took towards countering the 
insurgency was also similar to MAAG's. The focus on 
. 1 107 destroying the enemy's field forces remained 1n pace. As 
Krepinevich points out, "Priority was given to the 
destruction of guerrilla forces through large-scale 
• II 108 
operat1ons. The ARVN virtually never operated below 
battalion level and their attempts to counter the insurgents 
were usually accompanied by heavy doses of artillery and air 
support. That this was, in fact, the approach taken by MACV 
is perhaps most clearly evidenced in Neil Sheehan's A Bright 
Shining J,ie. In discussing Lieutenant Colonel John Paul 
Van's views during his first year as a MACV advisor, Sheehan 
states: 
106 Kr . . h 64 epmev1c , p. . 
107 For a detailed discussion of the strategy of attrition developed by GPF through MACV see 
Krepinevich, p. 164-168. See also Thompson and Frizzle, Chapter V, "The Strategy of Attrition," pp. 73-
107. 
108 Ibid., p. 56. 
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Because he[Vann] saw the solution to the conflict 
primarily in military terms during his first year 
in Vietnam, Vann focused on the initial priority 
he and [Colonel Daniel Boone] Porter had agreed 
upon- the destruction of the main striking forces 
of the Viet Cong through surprise helicopter 
assaults ... The quickest way to halt the momentum 
of this revolution, Vann believed, was to break 
the point of the spear. If the regular or 
provincial guerrillas were killed off or 
scattered, the communists would no longer be able 
to mass a force for big ambushes of road convoys 
and of Saigon's territorial troops as they marched 
through the countryside during the day trying to 
assert the regime's authority. 109 
While Vann later changed his views, MACV continued 
throughout 1962 and 1963 to try and "break the point of the 
spear." In 1962, for example, MACV' s operations officer 
Brigadier General (BG) Kelleher stated "MACV's mission is to 
kill VC, plain and simple." no 
The above statements by Krepinevich and Sheehan also 
reveal that MACV pursued their attempts to "kill VC" through 
conventional doctrine and tactics. Regiment and division 
operations were the norm. 111 Furthermore, MACV made 
extensive use of helicopters and air mobile operations to 
attempt to surprise and "fix" guerrillas. These operations, 
109 Sheehan, p. 66. 
110 David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire, (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 60. Also cited 
in Krepinevich, p. 64. 
111 BDM Corporation, A Study of the Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, Vol. 6, Book 1, "Operational 
Analysis," (McLean, Virginia., 1980), p. 135. Also cited in Krepinevich, p. 58. 
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as mentioned above, were almost always preceded by air 
'k d '11 f' 112 str1 es an art1 ery 1res. 
While it focused primarily on destroying the guerrilla 
forces in the field, MACV did participate in attempts at 
pacification as well. The strategic Hamlet program, which 
began in January 1962, is a case in point. 
The program grew out of two separate plans, one 
proposed by MAAG (MACV had not yet activated) and one 
proposed by the British advisory team headed by the well 
known counterinsurgency expert Sir Robert Thompson. MACV's 
plan consisted of three phases. The first phase involved 
training political cadre and gathering intelligence on the 
areas targeted for pacification. The second phase called 
for large-scale sweep operations conducted by the ARVN to 
defeat or drive out VC guerrillas in the target areas. In 
phase three, the ARVN was to hand over control of the areas 
to the civil guard and the self defense corps who would, in 
turn, establish permanent security. MAAG proposed that the 
plan begin by pacifying the six provinces closest to Saigon. 
It believed these six provinces as well as Kontum province 
could be pacified by the end of 1961 or, at the latest, 
112 Sheehan, p. 106. 
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early 1962. 113 The priority would then shift to the Mekong 
Delta and the Central Highlands and the rest of the country 
would follow. All together, MAAG envisioned the entire 
country being pacified by the end of 1964. MAAG' s plan, 
however, was not adopted as such. 
The Diem regime preferred the plan proposed by Thompson 
and the British, which differed from MAAG's plan in several 
ways. It focused primarily on the implementation of strict 
security measures by the civil guard and the self defense 
corps similar to the methods the British had employed in 
Malaya. The ARVN was to play a supporting, rather than a 
leading, role. Furthermore, Thompson proposed that the 
program begin in an area of weak VC activity, not the 
S . ll4 insurgent strongholds in the provinces surrounding algon. 
The plan that was eventually implemented as the Strategic 
Hamlet program was a compromise between the British and 
American plans. 
As mentioned above, Diem preferred the British 
proposal, but LTG McGarr, the MAAG chief, voiced some strong 
objections. He was first concerned that the British plan 
neglected the VC stronghold in War Zone D, northeast of 
113 Krepinevich, p. 66. 
114 Ibid., p. 67. 
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S . 115 a1gon. McGarr further objected to the secondary role of 
the ARVN, the lack of offensive operations, and the slow 
116 
rate of progress that Thompson had proposed. As a result 
of these objections, Thompson's plan was modified somewhat 
and on 19 March 1962, the Strategic Hamlet Program began 
with an ARVN sweep through Binh Duong province to the north 
of Saigon. 
The operation, code named Sunrise, was something less 
than a rousing success. The area was heavily infested with 
117 VC and it was close to their support bases. This was not 
so much a problem for the ARVN conducting their sweep, but 
it was a problem for the civil forces who had the mission of 
following up and rooting out the VC infrastructure. 
Additionally, the plan called for the forced resettlement of 
much of the local population. This combined with the way in 
which the resettlement was carried out left the local 
peasants, whom the program was designed to win over, felling 
more alienated from the regime than ever. 118 
The shortcomings in Operation Sunrise were repeated 
elsewhere as the Strategic Hamlet Program grew. 
115 Gravel, vol. 2, p. 141. See also Krepinevich, p. 67. 
116 Ibid., vol. 2: p. 142-143. 
117 Krepinevich, p. 67. 
118 Ibid., p. 68. 
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MAAG and, 
later, MACV continued to be interested primarily in the 
military sweep operations. Very little support or attention 
was provided to the civil guard or the self defense forces 
who had the mission of providing long term security. This 
is evidenced by the fact that every ARVN battalion had an 
American advisor while only one advisor at the province 
level was assigned to the civil security forces. 
Additionally, there was no unified command structure for the 
S . 1 119 trateglc Ham et program. Each province directed its own 
efforts and set its own priorities. In spite of complaints 
from the US advisors, MACV never made any serious attempts 
to fix this problem. Finally, that MACV focused more on 
the military search and destroy operations than the actual 
development of the hamlets is evidenced by its tolerance of 
blatant falsification of progress reports by the Government 
of Vietnam. Less than one month after the program began, 
the Vietnamese government was reporting over 1,300 fortified 
hamlets. In September, six months after the program began, 
2,500 Hamlets were being reported as operational. When Diem 
was assassinated in November 1963, less than two years into 
the program, the total number of Hamlets reported was over 
119 Ibid., p. 69. 
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8 1 0 0 0 • 120 Most of these so called strategic hamlets were 
fortified and operational on paper only. This 1 too 1 was 
reported to MACV through its provincial advisors but 1 again 1 
no serious attempt was made to challenge the Vietnamese 
governments assertions or correct the situation on the 
ground. 
As Krepinevich points out/ MACV 1 S response to the 
Strategic Hamlet program can be characterized as indifferent 
at best. It supported the program in so far as it provided 
an opportunity to conduct military operations to destroy 
guerrilla forces/ but it paid little attention to long-term 
pacification/ the supposed purpose of the program. 
3. The CIA and Ar.my Special Forces 
The strategic Hamlet Program was not the only attempt 
at pacification/ however. In late 1961 1 Army Special Forces 
began to implement the Civilian Irregular Defense Group 
program. The program was originally conceived by the CIA 
with the goal of denying the VC access to food/ supplies 1 
recruits 1 and intelligence in the Central Highlands of 
Vietnam. 121 Because of ethnic and racial tensions between 
120 Gravel, vol. 2, p. 150. Also cited in Krepinevich, p. 69. 
121 Robert Rheault, The Special Forces and the CIDG Program, in Thompson and Frizzell, pp. 246-249. 
See also Krepinevich, pp. 69-71. 
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the tribes of the Highlands and the Vietnamese government, 
the program was run solely by Americans, in the form of the 
CIA and the Special Forces, and only loosely connected to 
122 the Strategic Hamlet Program. Although the program was 
conceived and funded by the CIA, the task of designing a 
specific strategy and implementing it fell to the Special 
Forces. 123 In November 1961, two Special Forces (SF) A-
Detachments were deployed from the 1st Special Forces Group 
in Okinawa and the program got off the ground. 
The strategy developed by the SF was dubbed the Village 
Defense Program and was simple and defensive in nature. The 
A-Detachments began to arm and train highlands tribesmen to 
protect themselves against the VC. The SF detachments would 
locate themselves in an area, become familiar with the 
people and the local villages, and begin to prepare ~imple 
defenses. First, they would recruit and train a small 
"strike force" made up of local villagers. This 
paramilitary-military strike force was designed and trained 
to provide local villages with a full time security force. 
They would typically provide reinforcement to villages under 
attack, patrol between villages, and set ambushes for VC. 
122 Ibid., p. 247-251. 
123 Ibid., p. 247. 
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Once the SF had established an effective strike force, they 
would begin to train "village defenders." These groups 
received basic training in weapons handling and were taught 
to defend and fortify their own villages. They fought only 
when their village was under direct attack and each village 
was provided a simple radio with which to contact the SF 
teams and the strike force for reinforcement in the event of 
trouble. Once the village defenders were established, the 
SF teams supervised programs to improve the quality of life 
for villagers. They established infirmaries and provided 
minor medical treatment, constructed shelters, and generally 
helped in any way they could. As soon as a mutually 
supporting cluster of villages had been established, the 
process began all over again and the perimeter pushed out 
further to include other villages. 
The success of the two A-Detachments was extraordinary 
and by April 1962, forty villages in Darlac Province had 
124 
voluntarily entered the program. In May of 1962, eight 
more teams were sent from Okinawa to Vietnam and the success 
continued. In July, the CIA requested 16 more SF teams and 
by August, approximately 200 villages were participating in 
124 Kr 0 ° h 70 epmev1c , po 0 
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125 the program. Overall, the Special Forces' defensive 
strategy, focused on denying the Viet Cong access to the 
indigenous population and the resources they provided, 
seemed to be working well. It differed markedly from the 
Strategic Hamlet Program in that it was able to provide an 
effective presence, rather than simply a paper presence, and 
it involved no forced resettlement. 
4. MACV in Charge 
As the size and scope of the CIDG program continued to 
grow, the decision was made to switch control from the CIA 
to MACV. The decision was based primarily on the growing 
numbers of SF troops involved and the overt, rather than 
covet, nature of the operations. Code named Operation 
Switchback, the transfer was completed by July 1963 and once 
MACV was in command, both the missions assigned to Special 
Forces and the way in which the CIDG program was executed 
began to change. 
MACV was generally unhappy with the way in which the 
Special Forces had been employed under the CIA. It viewed 
their employment in the CIDG Program as "static training 
activities" and felt that they would be better utilized in 
125 Ibid., p. 71. 
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. d ff . . 126 more "act1ve an o ens1ve operat1ons." As a result, Army 
SF were largely removed from their role in administering and 
expanding the CIDG Program. They were assigned, instead, 
the missions of providing surveillance along the Cambodian 
and Laotian borders and conducting offensive, direct action, 
. b 127 missions aga1nst VC ases. This change in mission began 
in late 1963 and was completed by the end of 1964. On 1 
January 1965, Colonel John H. Speers, the commander of the 
newly organized 5th Special Forces Group, issued a letter of 
instruction outlining the missions assigned to the Group by 
MACV. They were listed as: 
Border surveillance and control, 
against infiltration routes, and 
against VC war zones and base areas. 128 
operations 
operations 
All of these missions clearly reflected MACV' s 
offensive strategy which focused on finding, fixing, and 
destroying the enemy forces in the field. 
In addition to reorienting the Special Forces, MACV was 
making changes to the CIDG Program as well. In order to 
free-up US Special Forces for offensive operations and 
126 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Army Staff, cable, LTG Barksdale Hamlett to 
General Collins, 15 August 1962, Center for Military History. Also cited in Krepinevich, p. 72. 
127 Rheault, p. 250. See also Krepinevich, p. 72. 
128 Headquarters, 5th United States Army Special Forces Group, Letter oflnstruction Number I, "The 
Special Forces Counterinsurgency Program," 1 January, 1965, Center for Military History. Also cited in 
Krepinevich, p. 75. 
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border surveillance, the responsibility of training strike 
forces and village defenders as well as the responsibility 
for administering the program was transferred to the 
Vietnamese Special Forces. Unfortunately, they were nowhere 
bl h . 129 near as capa e as t e~r US counterparts. Not only were 
they less capable in terms of their own skills and 
leadership, but they tended to be insensitive, indifferent, 
or both, to the needs of the minority populations that the 
CIDG Program had focused on. Thus, many of the gains made 
earlier in "winning" the population were lost. 
A second change in the program occurred as well. The 
Government of Vietnam decided to integrate the strike forces 
of the CIDG Program into the ARVN. 130 It is not clear 
weather MACV recommended this change or simply allowed it to 
happen, but, whichever the case 1 it was not long before MACV 
began employing them in ways for which they were never 
intended. They, like the US Special Forces, began to be 
used in a more offensive role. It became common for strike 
forces to be airlifted from one place to another either in 
support of Special Forces raid or surveillance missions or 
in support of conventional ARVN operations. For example, in 
129 Krepinevich, p. 72. 
130 Ibid., p. 72. 
94 
October 1963, MACV unveiled a plan to use CIDG strike 
forces, in conjunction with SF, to "attack VC base camps and 
interdict the infiltration of men and supplies from North 
Vietnam. " 131 Removing the strike forces from their local 
area of operations and employing them in areas unfamiliar to 
them drastically reduced their effectiveness and perverted 
the purpose for which they were created. Not only did 
removing them from their local areas of operation weaken the 
mutually supporting village defense system the program had 
originally created, but without detailed knowledge of the 
local terrain, strike forces became little more than 
marginally trained infantry. 
MACV also attempted to expand the program rapidly. It 
did so partly out of a desire to exploit the success of the 
program and partly to increase the military utility it 
received from CIDG camps and villages. CIDG camps began to 
be located for strictly military reasons. As Colonel Robert 
Rheault, a former commander of the 5th Special Forces Group 
wrote: 
As it spread to other areas, the program began to 
be bastardized. Military authorities wanted a 
camp in a certain area for military reasons with 
131 Krepinevich, p. 73. 
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no regard to the political or demographic facts of 
life. 132 
Camps were often set astride suspected infiltration routes 
or placed in areas of heavy VC activity, neither of which 
served the original purpose of population control. 
By the start of 1965, the CIDG program had been fully 
integrated with the Strategic Hamlet Program and, 
unfortunately, the former took on most of the 
characteristics of the later. 
5. The US Sends Combat Troops 
In spite of the best efforts of MACV, the ARVN, and all 
the other governmental agencies involved, both US and 
Vietnamese, the situation in Vietnam continued to grow 
worse. By the end of 1964 the Viet Cong were beginning to 
conduct coordinated regimental operations. In early January 
1965, the insurgents attacked and seized the village of Binh 
Gia only 40 miles from Saigon. In reclaiming the town, ARVN 
forces suffered 201 men killed in action (KIA) compared with 
only 32 confirmed VC KIAs (the official estimate was 132). 
This event and others like it ultimately lead to the 
commitment of US troops to combat in Vietnam. 133 
132 Rheault, p. 250. 
133 Some have argued that the commitment of US combat troops was as much a result of political and 
bureaucratic considerations as it was the ground tactical situation. While this study is not so much 
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The strategy MACV pursued with US troops was not unlike 
the one it had pursued with the ARVN. It was essentially a 
strategy of attrition. 134 MACV and General William 
Westmoreland, who had assumed command from Harkins on 20 
June 1964, believed that the ARVN had failed to stem· the 
tide of the insurgency because they lacked an "offensive" 
spirit and the will to engage the enemy in sustained combat. 
As Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor noted: 
The Vietnamese 






and the basic 
they lack is 
MACV, however, had no doubts about the ability or motivation 
of US forces. They would certainly take the fight to the 
enemy and succeed where the ARVN had failed. MACV's 
attitude and approach to the employment of US troops is 
perhaps best summarized by Krepinevich who states: 
The Army remained convinced that the essence of 
the conflict was military, not political. 
Politics would take a back seat while the Army 
inflicted sufficient damage on the insurgents to 
force them to the peace table. Once it became 
clear that US ground combat forces were necessary 
to prevent the fall of South Vietnam to the 
interested in why troops were committed as the strategy they employed once they arrived, Krepinevich 
provides an interesting discussion in Chapter 5, "Forty-four Battalions across the Rubicon," pp. 131-163. 
134 The Overall strategy for employing US forces in Vietnam is almost unanimously referred to as a 
strategy of attrition in the literature. For example, Krepinevich, Cable, Thompson and Frizzell, Summers 
all refer to it as such. Even General William Westmoreland in "A Military War of Attrition" in Thompson 
and Frizzell, pp. 57-71 refers to it as such. 
135 Cable, Maxwell Taylor to the President, 5 January 1965, Center for Military History. Also cited in 
Krepinevich, p. 135. 
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Communists, the Army's primary concern was the 
deployment of forces to execute the same strategy 
that the ARVN had been failing at for years, only 
. d . . 136 
with greater resources and 1ncrease 1ntens1ty. 
The tactics with which US forces pursued the strategy 
of attrition were also similar to those used by the ARVN in 
years before. Search-and-destroy missions remained the 
modus operendi as did the use of large-unit operations and 
an emphasis on air mobility to surprise and "fix" the enemy. 
The first division to be completely deployed to Vietnam was, 
in fact, was the Ist Air Cavalry Division. Furthermore, 
once in country, it was immediately deployed to the Central 
Highlands, where the insurgency was the strongest, to began 
search and destroy operations; the results of which only 
served to reinforce the Army's belief that attrition was an 
. t 137 appropr1ate stra egy. When the Ist Cav moved into 
the Central Highlands in November of 1965, they almost 
immediately encountered a large concentration of Viet Cong 
and North Vietnamese in the Ia Drang Valley. The ensuing 
battle was one of the bloodiest of the war and the use of 
American firepower resulted in 1, 200 enemy KIAs versus a 
comparatively low 200 for the Ist Cavalry. 
136 Krepinevich, p. 131. 
137 Ibid., p. 169. 
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The victory 
served largely to reinforce MACV's views that the war could 
be won through attrition and that the source of the problem 
was North Vietnam. 
From Ia Drang, MACV never looked back. From that point 
forward it pursued its strategy of attrition through the 
application of firepower relentlessly right up to the 
beginning of the withdrawal of US troops. 138 That is not to 
say, however, that there were not attempts at alternative 
strategies, there were, but they were not initiated by MACV 
and the command generally tolerated them more than it 
embraced them. 
One such alternative strategy was developed by the 
Marines and referred to as the Combined Action Platoons 
(CAPs) Program. The strategy of CAPs was not unlike that of 
the Special Forces in the CIDG Program. A plato.on of 
Marines would establish a presence in a village, get to know 
the local population, and provide protection from the VC. 
They would work hard to establish local intelligence nets 
and assist in training the local police forces, shifting 
more responsibility over to them as they became more 
capable. The results, as well, were similar to those of the 
138 Ibid., pp. 169-172. 
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CIDG Program in the early days under the SF. By 1966, there 
were 57 CAPs operating in villages in the Ist Corps tactical 
zone. 
MACV was, however, less than enthusiastic about the 
Marines program and to a large degree considered it 
ineffective because it did not produce the number of VC 
casualties that Army search and destroy operations did. MG 
Dupey, MACV's Operations Officer, stated: 
The Marines came in and just sat down and didn't 
do anything. They were involved in 
counterinsurgency of the deliberate, mild sort. 139 
General Harry Kinnard, the commander of the Ist Cavalry 
during the Ia Drang battle and latter a MACV staff officer, 
remarked: 
I did everything I could to drag them out and get 
them to fight ... They just wouldn' t play. They 
just would not play. They don't know how to fight 
1 d . 1 1 . . 11 140 on an , part1cu ar y aga1nst guerr1 as. 
Ironically, judging from their success, the Marines 
seem to have known much more about fighting guerrillas on 
land than either of the two officers quoted above. 
A second alternative to attrition surfaced in May of 
1967 with the initiation of the Civil Operations and 
139 Interview of William Dupey by Krepinevich, 26 March, 1979, as cited in Krepinevich, p. 17 5. 
140 Interview of Harry Kinnard by Krepinevich, 21 June 1982, as cited in Krepinevich, p. 175. 
100 
Revolutionary Support Program (CORDS) . The program came 
about as a result of Defense Secretary McNamara and 
President Johnson's growing feelings that the military 
strategy was ineffective and that more needed to be done in 
the area of pacification. At the direction of President 
Johnson, responsibility for pacification was given directly 
to MACV. Additionally, Robert Komer, the President's 
special assistant for pacification, was sent to Vietnam as 
the Deputy Commander, United States Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam, with the rank of Ambassador. The 
placement of Komer high in the MACV chain of command and the 
personal interest of the President resulted in some 
significant improvements in the pacification program. For 
the first time, a unified chain of command for pacification 
activities was developed and pacification activities were 
closely coordinated with military activities. Komer was 
also able to gain access to the considerable resources of 
MACV in implementing pacification pr.ograms. Training for 
the paramilitary police forces was improved, and targeting 
of the VC infrastructure increased, most notably through the 
Ph . 141 oen1x Program. 
141 The Phoenix Program was an effort to oversee and assist the efforts of district and province 
intelligence organizations to identify, locate and eliminate VC cadre. For an excellent detailed account of 
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The implementation of CORDS, however, did not change 
MACV's focus on the "shooting war." It supported Komer and 
CORDS, but still believed the path to victory was through 
the destruction of the VC field forces. This is perhaps 
most clearly evidenced by a statement made by LTG Julian 
Ewell, a corps commander who commented: 
I had two rules. One is that you would try to get 
a very close meshing of pacification ... and 
military operations. The other rule is the 
military operations would be given first priority 
in every case. That does not mean that you 
wouldn't do pacification, but this gets at what 
you might call winning the hearts and minds of the 
people. I'm all for that. Its a nice concept, 
but in fighting the Viet Cong and the NVA [North 
Vietnamese Army], if you don't break their 
military machine, you might as well forget winning 
the hearts and minds of the people. 142 
Thus, it is fairly clear that from the time US troops 
were committed in 1965 to the time they began to be 
withdrawn, the focus of MACV remained on pursuing a strategy 
of attrition by attempting to destroy the Viet Cong field 
forces. 
C. ANALYSIS 
The American experience in Vietnam strongly supports 
the hypotheses of Chapter III. In the early years of the 
the program, see Dale Andrade, Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War, (Lexington, 
MA: Lexington Books, 1990). 
142 Interview of Julian J. Ewell by Krepinevich, 10 Aprill979, as cited in Krepinevich, p. 222. 
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war, when GPF and SOF were operating independently, the way 
in which each organization attempted to solve the UW problem 
posed by the insurgency in the South clearly reflected their 
respective cultures and specialization (Hypothesis one and 
two) . When the two forces were integrated in 1963 under GPF 
command, the way in which the integrated force attempted to 
solve the insurgency reflected the culture and 
specialization of GPF (Hypothesis three) . Finally, the 
approach taken by SOF acting independently in the early 
years more closely resembled an appropriate UW solution as 
discussed in Chapter II, and was largely more successful 
than was the GPF approach or the integrated approach 
(Hypothesis four). To see that this was, in fact, the case, 
consider each hypothesis more closely. 
1. Evaluating Hypothesis One 
One would expect GPF to design solutions to UW 
problems consistent with their organizational 
culture and functional specialization. That is, 
one would expect them to design solutions which 
focus on victory through the defeat of the enemy's 
armed forces through the use of overwhelming force 
as conceived of and practiced in preparation for a 
European war. (See p. 72) 
In the American experience in Vietnam, GPF, as an 
organization, was represented by first MAAG and, later, 
MACV. That MAAG and MACV were, in fact, GPF organizations 
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is clearly evidenced by the fact that the advisors assigned 
to them came from GPF backgrounds and received no special or 
additional training prior to assuming their new duties. Not 
only were the advisors GPF personnel, but the commanding 
officers were as well. The background and experience of LTG 
McGarr and LTG Harkins, for example, were overwhelmingly 
conventional. Thus, while MAAG and MACV may not have been 
GPF units in the traditional sense, they were, none-the-
less, de facto GPF organizations. Therefore, the solution 
to the insurgency in Vietnam adopted by MAAG and MACV 
represents the solution adopted by GPF. In light of this 
fact, it is easy to see how the American experience in 
Vietnam clearly supports the first hypothesis. 
To demonstrate that the solution adopted by MAAG and 
MACV from 1954-1963 was, in fact, consistent with the 
organizational culture and functional specialization of GPF 
is a fairly straightforward matter. It is clearly evidenced 
by the way in which MAAG developed and trained the ARVN and 
the way it, and later MACV, employed the ARVN against the 
insurgency in the South. 
Consider first the development of the ARVN. In spite 
of the fact that the mission given to MAAG by the NSC 
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through the JCS was to develop a force capable of providing 
internal security for Vietnam, MAAG developed a relatively 
heavy force trained in conventional division and corps 
warfighting tactics. Furthermore, it did so largely over 
the objections of the Diem regime and against the basic 
tenants of counterinsurgency doctrine, both of which favored 
the smaller regional forces present in the initial 1954 
force structure. The fact that MAAG organized and trained a 
conventional army better suited to defending against 
external aggression than internal insurgency, in spite of 
being given a mission to the contrary, clearly reflects the 
influence of GPF functional specialization in European war. 
Consider also the strategy and tactics of MAAG and MACV 
for dealing with the insurgency. As the situation grew 
worse and the ARVN were called on more frequently to combat 
the insurgency, the strategy of MAAG and MACV continually 
focused on offensive operations designed to destroy the 
insurgents main guerrilla forces. Furthermore, MAAG and 
MACV advocated the use of heavy firepower, in the form of 
artillery and air support, in ARVN search and destroy 
operations. They continued to do so even in the face of 
objections by several of MAAG's and MACV's own advisors that 
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these tactics were counterproductive to the 
. ff 143 counter1nsurgency e ort. Thus 1 the strategy and tactics 
used by MAAG and MACV matched exactly the theory of victory 
embodied in GPF culture and the tactics that had been 
successful in two World Wars and Korea. 
Even when MAAG and MACV made attempts at employing more 
traditional counterinsurgency doctrine 1 such as 
pacification, their culture and specialization were evident. 
The plan proposed by MAAG for pacification in 1961 1 foe 
example 1 focused on large-unit sweeps and concentrated on 
areas of heavy VC infestation (see p. 85). Similarly 1 the 
objections raised by LTG McGarr to Sir Robert Thompson 1 s 
pacification plan also reflect a focus on the destruction of 
the enemy 1 s field forces through the use of offensive 
operations. Finally 1 the inattention of MAAG and MACV to 
the way in which the Strategic Hamlet Program was 
administered 1 once it was implemented 1 reflect the feeling 
that the program was less important than efforts to destroy 
guerrillas in the field. 
Clearly 1 then 1 the solution GPF designed for the UW 
problem posed by the insurgency in South Vietnam was I in 
143 See Sheehan, pp. 106-117. See also Krepinevich, pp. 80-84. 
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fact, overwhelmingly consistent with their organizational 
culture and functional specialization. 
2. Evaluating Hypothesis Two 
One would expect SOF organizations to design 
solutions to UW problems consistent with their 
culture and specialization. That is, one would 
expect SOF to design solutions focused on a more 
indirect approach than those designed by GPF and 
reflecting their understanding of, and 
specialization in, UW. (See p. 73) 
The validity of hypothesis two, like that of hypothesis 
one, is fairly easily demonstrated in the case of Vietnam. 
To see that the SOF solution to the problem posed by the 
insurgency was, in fact, more indirect than the GPF solution 
and reflected an understanding of, and specialization in, UW 
one need only examine the way in which the Army Special 
Forces designed and implemented the CIDG Program. 
The CIDG Program represented an indirect approach in 
that it focused on denying the VC access to the population 
and the corresponding resources rather than defeating the 
guerrillas in the field. Guerrillas were targeted only in 
so far as necessary to allow the Special Forces to maintain 
an effective presence and protect the population. 
Essentially, the SF would achieve a form of relative 
superiority in a single village at a time, rather than 
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relying on overwhelming force to defeat the entire guerrilla 
force in the field. The goal was not so much to destroy the 
VC, but rather to render them irrelevant to the villages 
within the CIDG Program. 
The SOF solution also demonstrates their cultural 
principles of innovation and flexibility, as well as their 
functional specialization in UW. While it is true that the 
SF were not specialized in counterinsurgency per se in the 
early 1960s, they were specialized in training partisan 
guerrilla forces (UW as it is narrowly defined in doctrine) . 
This specialization gave them an appreciation for the 
importance of language and culture in both being able to 
train a local population and being able to effectively 
develop ties to them. Meanwhile, their ability to innovate 
allowed them to adapt their skills in training partisan 
forces into an appropriate, form of counterinsurgency. 
Thus, the SOF approach to solving the insurgency was 
clearly different than the GPF approach and did, in fact, 
reflect the organizational culture and functional 
specialization of SOF. It clearly demonstrates an indirect 
approach as well as an ability to innovate, or, as General 
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Downing has characterized it, an ability to "Think outside 
the box." 
3. Evaluating Hypothesis Three 
In Integrated Operations, because of the 
hierarchical nature of military operations, one 
would expect the organizational approach of the· 
organization charged with command to dominate. 
(See p. 73) 
Once again, as in the case of hypothesis one and two, 
the American experience in Vietnam provides strong evidence 
in support of this hypothesis. In 1963, through operation 
Switchback, SOF and GPF were integrated under the unified 
command and control structure of MACV. Almost immediately 
afterward, the way in which SOF were employed began to 
change. In spite of their previous success, they were 
largely removed from the CIDG Program by MACV, who viewed 
their participation in it as "static training activities" of 
little value, and employed instead in more offensive, direct 
action missions. As the letter of instruction from Colonel 
Speers quoted earlier indicated, their new missions were 
defined as border surveillance and control, operations 
against infiltration routes, and operations against VC war 
zones and base areas. These new missions clearly indicate 
the dominance of the GPF approach based on the destruction 
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of the enemy's field forces. After the integration of 
SOF and GPF in 1963, the GPF approach continued to dominate 
throughout the rest of the war. CAPs and CORDS represent 
other attempts at pacification as an alternative approach, 
but neither was initiated or embraced by MACV. 
Thus, integrated operations in Vietnam clearly show 
that the approach of the organization in command dominated. 
Andrew Krepinevich perhaps summed up the integrated 
approach best when he wrote: 
In effect, MACV was getting Special Forces out of 
the counterinsurgency business and into supporting 
large-scale operations to combat the external 
threat . 144 
4. Evaluating Hypothesis Four 
Because of the nature of UW problems and their 
solutions as discussed in Chapter II, one would 
expect SOF to be generally more effective than GPF 
in designing solutions to UW challenges. (See p. 
73) 
Was the SOF solution in the form of the CIDG Program 
more effective than the GPF solution based on destruction of 
the enemy's guerrilla forces in the field? Perhaps the best 
way to demonstrate that it was is to discuss each solution 
in terms of the two models for thinking about the dynamics 
144 Kr 0 0 h 74 epmev1c , po 0 
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of, and appropriate solutions to, UW discussed in Chapter 
II. 
Consider, first, the "Mystic Triangle" (see Fig 1, p. 
45) . The CIDG Program, or SOF strategy, contained all three 
components of effective strategy suggested by the model. 
First, through an effective presence and limited civic 
action programs, it developed ties to the "society." 
Second, through that same presence, it was able to break the 
VC's ties to the society in a particular village. Third, 
the use of force against the VC directly was measured and 
discriminate. Local strike forces and village defenders 
made minimum use of firepower and waited for the VC to come 
to them, thus eliminating the targeting problem often 
associated with combating guerrillas. 
The GPF strategy, on the other hand, contained on~y one 
component of effective strategy; operations against the 
counter-state or VC. Furthermore, the fact that this 
component was pursued through the application of heavy 
firepower meant that the results were often 
counterproductive. By applying force in a non-discriminate 
manner, the GPF strategy often served to strengthen the VC 
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ties to society and weaken their own. 145 Thus, in terms of 
the "Mystic Triangle," the SOF strategy was obviously more 
effective. 
Consider, now, the Leites/Wolf Model (see Fig 2, p. 
47) . Once again, the SOF strategy employed, to one extent 
or the other, each of the four counter strategies suggested 
by the mode 1 . It denied the VC endogenous inputs by 
restricting access to the population; it targeted the VC 
"conversion mechanism" by eliminating the VC infrastructure 
in the villages in the Program; it targeted "outputs" 
through the use of strike forces and village defenders; and, 
finally, the program increased the ability of the population 
to absorb punishment by hardening villages and implementing 
modest civic programs. 
The GPF strategy, in comparison to the SOF strategy, 
effectively contained only two of the four counter 
strategies outlined by the model. The dominant strategy 
employed by GPF was obviously the destruction of outputs. 
Again, however, the way in which this strategy was pursued, 
through the indiscriminate use of firepower, was often 
counterproductive. The second strategy employed by GPF was 
145 Sheehan, pp. 106-117 and Krepinevich, pp. 80-84. 
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an attempt to limit exogenous inputs. This was done through 
attempts to seal the Laotian and Cambodian borders and 
through the air campaign against the North. No serious 
attempt was made by GPF to target the "conversion mechanism" 
or increase the ability of the population to absorb abuse. 146 
Thus, if one considers the requirements of an effective 
UW solution as they are outlined in Chapter II, the evidence 
strongly supports the assertion that the SOF approach was 
more appropriate and effective than the GPF approach. 
146 The Phoenix Program was an attempt to target the VC infrastructure, but it did not begin until 1968 





War is a strange sea, and once embarked upon, 
there is no foretelling where the voyage may lead. 
But it is not less true, and almost invariably the 
case, that when the thing is badly begun, from a 
false and misleading premise, the blunders will 
accumulate--that is more likely than the 




Based on the application of organization theory to the 
process of integration at the strategic level, and the 
evidence provided by the American experience in Vietnam, 
this study draws three conclusions. First, that 
organizational culture and functional specialization do, in 
fact, influence the way in which military organizations 
perceive and solve problems. Second, this study concludes 
that in integrated operations, the organizational culture 
and functional specialization of the organization in command 
is likely to have the dominant influence on the development 
of campaign strategy. Third, the study finds that the 
organizational culture and functional specialization of SOF, 
147 Winston Churchill, as cited in S.L.A. Marshall, "Thoughts on Vietnam," in Thompson and Frizzell, p. 
46. 
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are more consistent with the strategies and tactics required 
to solve UW problems than are those of GPF. 
These conclusions, when taken together, imply that in 
UW operations, the conventional wisdom regarding integrated 
operations is flawed; that by subordinating SOF to GPF,· the 
probability that the integrated force will design and 
implement an appropriate UW solution is greatly reduced. 
This, in turn, implies that changes in the way the US 
organizes its forces for combat in UW operations should be 
considered. 
B. THE PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT COMMAND STRUCTURE 
The problem with the current command structure, as it 
exists in the form of the unified command plan 1 is that it 
perpetuates the conventional wisdom of subordinating SOF to 
GPF in integrated operations. Virtually all the warfighting 
headquarters, in the form of theater CINCs and the JTFs they 
. F . . 14s establ1sh to fight campaigns, are GP organ1zat1ons. 
Consider, for example, the five regionally oriented 
unified commands. By virtue of the fact that the world is 
148 The five unified commands with geographic areas of responsibility are: United States Atlantic 
Command; United States Southern Command; United States European Command; United States Central 
Command; and United States Pacific Command. There are three other unified commands which have 
functional area responsibilities and are charged with the task of providing resources to the warfighting 
CINCs. They are: United States Special Operations Command; United States Transportation Command; 
and United States Space Command. 
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geographically divided between them, they are effectively 
responsible for all military operations, integrated or 
otherwise. 149 These theater commands, however, are 
predominately GPF organizations. At the time of this 
writing, all five were commanded by general officers with 
• 150 
overwhelmingly conventional exper1ence. Most of the staff 
officers, including the operations officers have GPF 
backgrounds as well. Thus, at the "macro" level, by virtue 
of the fact that they occur in one of the five geographic 
regions, all integrated operations, both conventional and 
unconventional, are commanded by GPF organizations. 
Furthermore, regional CINCs have the doctrinal 
responsibility of designing strategy and campaign plans for 
operations within their theater. 151 This implies that they, 
as predominately GPF organizations, design the solutions to 
both conventional and UW problems. 
It is perhaps unfair to characterize the regional 
unified commands as completely GPF organizations. There is 
a permanent SOF representation on the staff of each of these 
149 This is not strictly true. Some unilateral special operations, conducted within a CINCs area of 
responsibility, are commanded at the USSOCOM or national level. For all practical purposes, however, all 
integrated operations are commanded by the CINC or one of his sub-component commanders. 
150 This assertion is based an examination of the biographies of all five theater geographic CINCs in 
command on 2 March, 1996. 
151 Joint Pub 1, p. 47. 
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commands. Each regional CINC has, as a component command, a 
Special Operations Command (SOC) . This SOC is usually 
commanded by a brigadier general or a rear admiral and has 
the primary duties of advising the CINC on all matters 
pertaining to SOF and overseeing special operations within 
the command. Thus, there is, at least, SOF representation 
on the staff. It is interesting to note, however, that the 
other component commands (Army, Navy, and Air Force) are 
usually three or four star rank, as compared to the one star 
rank of the SOC. This may cause one to wonder about the 
SOC's ability to effect the decision making process of the 
organization. But, differences in rank aside, there is, at 
least, a permanent SOF presence at the unified command 
level. At the JTF level, where much of the actual planning 
and execution of operations occurs, there is seldom such a 
presence. 
JTFs are usually organized or activated to perform a 
specific mission or conduct a campaign. For example, JTFs 
180 and 190 were organized to conduct the recent 
intervention in Haiti. They are, however, like the regional 
unified commands, predominately GPF organizations. For 
example, JTFs are typically commanded by Army corps, Navy 
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fleets, or Marine Corps expeditionary forces. They can also 
be commanded by Army divisions or other smaller 
organizations, as was the case with JTF 190 in Haiti, which 
was commanded by the Army's lOth Mountain Division. SOF 
organizations are doctrinally capable of acting as JTF 
headquarters, but because of their generally smaller size 
and corresponding lack of staff capacity, this virtually 
never happens in integrated operations. Thus, integrated 
operations at the "micro" level, as well, are virtually 
always command by GPF organizations. Furthermore, unlike 
the regional unified commands, JTF headquarters, with the 
exception of Army corps, do not have a permanent SOF 
h . ff 152 presence on t elr sta s. Thus much of the planning for 
integrated operations, and consequently the development of 
campaign strategy, is done without the benefit of a habitual 
_SOF inf 1 uence . 
Thus, it is clear that the current warfighting system 
of regional unified commands and JTFs perpetuates the 
conventional wisdom of subordinating SOF to GPF in 
integrated operations. 
152 Army corps typically have a four man Special Operations Coordination Element or SOCCORD. 
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C. FIXING THE PROBLEM 
There are several ways in which the current command 
structure could be altered to redress the subordination of 
SOF to GPF in integrated operations in UW. Actually, from a 
purely doctrinal standpoint, the command structure does not 
have to be altered at all. Regional CINCs could simply 
designate SOF organizations as JTF headquarters in UW 
operations. Under current joint doctrine, this is possible, 
it is just never done. This solution, while it is the 
simplest, would have some significant practical drawbacks, 
however. First, it would require that CINCs, who usually 
come from GPF backgrounds, free themselves of their 
organizational biases, recognize UW problems as such, and 
act accordingly. Based on the inability of general officers 
of similar rank and responsibility to be able to do so in 
Vietnam, however, this seems like a difficult proposition at 
best. Second, under the current command structure, there 
are few SOF organizations truly capable of acting as JTF 
headquarters. Each regional SOC could probably do it, but 
it is difficult to imagine a Special Forces Group of a SEAL 




They simply do not have the required staff 
A more realistic approach to the problem, then, 
requires an alteration to the current command structure. 
There are several alternatives available, too many to list 
really. An approach similar to that taken by the Johnson 
Administration with respect to Robert Komer in Vietnam could 
be adopted. That is SOP officers could be placed as deputy 
commanders in regional unified commands where UW challenges 
are common, such as USSOUTHCOM. Other approaches, such as 
creating SOP divisions with headquarters large enough to act 
as JTP headquarters could be adopted as well. The solution 
which might be most appropriate, however, would be to 
establish USSOCOM as a warfighting headquarters. This would 
undoubtedly require a certain amount of institutional 
redesign, but the end product could create a significant 
amount of flexibility in the number and size of SOP 
headquarters available to act as JTP headquarters. It would 
also provide a unified command headquarters to run large 
scale UW operations like the US involvement in Vietnam. 
The difficulty with this alternative is that it would be 
hard to integrate with the regional CINCs. It would require 
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that the decision as to which command would have 
"jurisdiction" be made either at the JCS or National Command 
Authority level. It does, however, warrant further serious 
consideration. The important thing is that a solution be 
devised which allows for SOF organizations to command 
integrated operations in UW. 
D. CLOSING THOUGHTS 
The lesson that virtually every nation in the world 
learned from the 1991 Persian Gulf War is that the United 
States cannot be beaten on a conventional battlefield, at 
least not in the immediate future. Recent events in 
Chechnya and other regions within the former Soviet Union 
make it clear that not even the Russians could challenge the 
US in conventional, high intensity warfare. Relative to the 
United States, the other nations and organizations of the 
world operate from a position of relative weakness. This 
implies that the those who find it necessary to contend 
militarily with the US are very likely to choose an 
unconventional warfare strategy. 
Since its experience in Vietnam, the US has shied away 
from UW. 153 During the Cold War, the emphasis in training 
153 See Stephen Mariano, Peacekeepers Attend the Never-Again School, Masters Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1995. See also the Weinberger Doctrine. 
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and force structure was on conventional, high intensity, 
warfare, and, given the threat, this was, perhaps, 
appropriate. In the security environment that has emerged 
since the end of the Cold War, however, the US can no longer 
afford to be shy when it comes to UW. It must be capable of 
operating effectively in conventional and uw 
environments. A better understanding of the process of 
integration between SOF and GPF and the unique skills and 
talents each brings to the table may be a positive first-




In addition to the books referenced in footnotes, the 
following books were useful: 
Barry M. Blechman, et. Al. The American Military and the 
21st Century, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) 
Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy, 
Stackpole Co. 1964) 
(Harrisburg, PA: 
Francis F. Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and 
the Americans in Vietnam, (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 
1972) 
John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold 
War: Implications. Reconsiderations and Provocations, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992) 
Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: 
The System Worked, (Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution, 1979) 
Robert Jervis , ..r;;:.P..soe;..br~c..se""'p~tbo.l.b.. );.!o..!...,!n..;;;s~_Ba..!dnbl.<d"--_!:JML.!,i..;;;s!J.pLSe;<.drb...\c~e;;<,p~t..d.i>J.<o~n!,i;s2..,__,di,un 
International Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University 
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Samuel L. Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political 
Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam, (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1979) 
Stephen Peter Rosen, 
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1991) 
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